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COURTS AS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS:
BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
Kathleen G. Noonan, Jonathan C. Lipson and William H. Simon*
This article compares two spheres in which courts induce and oversee the restructuring of
organizations that fail systematically to comply with their legal obligations: bankruptcy
reorganization and public law litigation (civil rights or regulatory suits seeking structural
remedies). The analogies between bankruptcy and public law litigation (PLL) have grown
stronger in recent years as structural decrees have evolved away from highly specific directives
to “framework” decrees designed to induce engagement with stakeholders and make
performance transparent. We use the comparison with bankruptcy, where the value and
legitimacy of judicial intervention are better understood and more accepted, to address
prominent criticisms of PLL. Our comparison shows that judicial intervention in both spheres
responds to coordination problems that make individual stakeholder action ineffective, and it
explains how courts in both spheres can require and channel major organizational change
without administering the organizations themselves or inefficiently constricting the discretion of
managers. The comparison takes on greater urgency in light of the Trump Administration’s vow
to “deconstruct the administrative state,” a promise which, if kept, will likely increase demand
for PLL.
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COURTS AS INSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS:
BANKRUPTCY AND PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
I. Introduction
Large organizations sometimes fail, and when they do courts may be asked to
provide a remedy. Often, the remedy is restructuring. Perhaps the largest categories of
judicial restructuring are bankruptcy reorganization and “public law litigation” (PLL)—
civil rights or regulatory cases seeking structural relief against a government agency.
Both types of intervention occur frequently, and contrary to some claims, there is no
evidence that either is in terminal decline.1
Bankruptcy and PLL address similar problems in similar ways, but PLL has
proved vastly more controversial. No one doubts that bankruptcy courts have the
authority to facilitate massive change in troubled corporations. While there are debates at
the margins about how best to achieve bankruptcy’s goals, most commentators concede
the effectiveness of such intervention in a substantial range of cases.
There is, on the other hand, much more controversy about both the legitimacy and
the efficacy of judicial efforts in public law litigation to reform prisons, schools, police
departments and other public agencies. Critics assert that judicial efforts to restructure
public institutions are categorically undemocratic, or ineffective, or both.2
Yet, the rationales and the techniques of intervention are similar in both spheres.3
Although the details of practice vary, the most characteristic form of bankruptcy
reorganization resembles an increasingly common form of intervention in public law
litigation. Specifically, we compare the Chapter 11 “bootstrap” reorganization, in which
the bankruptcy court supervises the restructuring of an organization that is expected to
continue operation as a freestanding entity, with the PLL “framework” decree in which
the district court induces fairly comprehensive reform, but focuses largely on governance
and accountability structures rather than mandating specific practices.
Both types of intervention share important features: Judicial intervention is
triggered by the demonstrated inability of the organization to satisfy large-scale legal
1

See notes 33-43, infra, and sources cited there.

2

E.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS
RUN GOVERNMENT 10 (2003); John Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot?: The Inherent Remedial
Authority of Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996); DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY (1977). We collect and address major criticisms in Part IV.
3

In his seminal article defining and christening “public law litigation”, Abram Chayes pointed out the
analogy to bankruptcy, noting that “[f]rom 1870 to 1933, federal judges reorganized over 1,000 railroads.”
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1303 (1976). He
didn’t develop the analogy, however. Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen Yeazell, and later, Susan Sturm,
seconded Chayes’ observation, but they did not develop it either. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C.
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 485-86
(1980); Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L. J. 1355, 1385, 1445 (1991).
.

1
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obligations. Both types of relief respond to collective action problems that make
individual claim adjudication impossible or inefficient. The courts help the parties
develop remedial frameworks that limit incumbent managers’ control over the
organization for the benefit of stakeholders whose legal interests are jeopardized by its
operations. In various ways, courts force or persuade managers to account to and engage
with the organizations’ stakeholders in order to comply with baseline obligations.
Critics mistakenly assume that PLL courts actually “run” the agencies they help to
restructure. But this is no more the case in PLL than in bankruptcy. Rather, bankruptcy
courts in Chapter 11 cases and district courts in PLL cases typically issue decrees that
focus on broad issues of governance and accountability reflected in frameworks
negotiated by the parties. Like bankruptcy judges, district judges in PLL do not directly
impose practices derived from doctrine or technical expertise. In principle, the court
withdraws when the debtor or defendant has given credible assurance that its
reconfigured operations will respect the interests of the complaining stakeholders. While
PLL and corporate bankruptcy obviously differ in their details, courts and participants in
these processes address them in substantially similar ways, an analogy that has for too
long been ignored.
Our comparison seeks to quiet anxieties about public law litigation and to enhance
explanations about how it works. By analogizing PLL to a less controversial area of
practice, we emphasize that judicially-supervised organizational reform is not unique to
public law, and that the most common criticisms of it are ill-informed or misplaced. At
the same time, the analogy facilitates generalizations about how this kind of judicial
intervention works, and how it can be further improved.
Our analysis is also motivated by a sense of urgency. The Trump Administration
has vowed to “deconstruct the administrative state,”4 which implies, among other things,
a reduction in the level and quality of services administered by public agencies. A new
wave of institutional reform litigation may be one response, whether to enforce existing
decrees, or to address new grievances, or both. In the near term, courts may face new and
greater PLL challenges than they have in many years.
Part II gives a brief overview of the two spheres of reorganizational practice. Part
III reveals important similarities in these facially different areas of practice. Part IV uses
the comparison to bankruptcy to challenge major complaints about PLL, to establish
affirmative grounds for judicially-supervised restructuring in both spheres, and to offer
suggestions about further adaptation in PLL practice by analogy to bankruptcy.

4

Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, Bannon vows a daily fight for ‘deconstruction of the administrative
state’, Wash. Post., Feb. 23, 2017 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategistvows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01d47f8cf9b643_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.c045781929a0 (accessed Aug. 26, 2017).
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II. Two Spheres of Court-Supervised Reorganization
A. Chapter 11 Reorganizations
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the principal legal mechanism for
restructuring troubled but viable business organizations.5 It prescribes a judicial process
overseen by specialized, congressionally-created (Article I) courts that are “units” of, and
supervised by, United States District (Article III) courts.6
Bankruptcy courts have power that can be characterized as deep but
circumscribed. It is deep because the commencement of a case results immediately in the
creation of an “estate” composed of all of the debtor’s property, and a nationwide
injunction (the “automatic stay”) to shield that property from creditor collection actions.7
This temporary injunction will largely become permanent if the debtor confirms a “plan
of reorganization,” an instrument that shares important substantive features with the
framework decree in public law litigation.8 It is circumscribed, however, because it is
generally delimited by the “debtor-creditor relationship.”9
Restructuring in this context has no single template, but typically involves the
refinancing and discharge of debt, the sale of certain lines of business, entity
reconfiguration, and changes in management and personnel and firm governance. 10
Although there are many variations, we focus chiefly on the traditional “bootstrap”
reorganization, where management remains in possession and control of the debtor, and
proposes a reorganization plan whereby the company will remain a largely standalone,
going concern after bankruptcy.11
5

“Chapter 11” generally refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq., as well as other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and Judicial Code. The current version of the Bankruptcy Code was originally enacted in 1978
(Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549), and has been amended several times,
most recently in 2005. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 U.S.C.).
6

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).

7

11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 362(a).

8

See In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (observing that a reorganization plan
“represents a kind of consent decree which has many attributes of a contract.”).

9

Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I Judicial Power,
Fraudulent Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1195, 1226.

10

As LoPucki and Doherty explain, companies in Chapter 11—
may undergo tumultuous changes during bankruptcy. They may shrink in size, be split into
multiple businesses, sell their businesses to new owners, discharge their managers, change their
names, and fundamentally change the nature of their businesses. One or more businesses may
survive after a bankruptcy, but it may nevertheless be difficult to say whether that survivor is the
bankrupt company, a company that acquired the bankrupt company, or a company that acquired
elements of the bankrupt company.

Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV. 970, 979-80 (2015).
11

There is some concern among practitioners and observers that bootstrap reorganizations are passe, and
that Chapter 11 is now chiefly used to sell companies. Baird and Rasmussen dramatically opened a 2002
paper: “Corporate reorganizations have all but disappeared.” Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002). Brubaker and Tabb have a more temperate view:

3
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Some of the nation’s largest and most economically important companies have
reorganized under Chapter 11, including General Motors12 and Chrysler13, every legacy
commercial airline (e.g., American,14 United,15 Delta16), most companies with exposure
to asbestos liability (e.g., Johns-Manville,17 W.R. Grace18), as well as many “big-box”
retailers (e.g., RadioShack 19 ), industrial firms (e.g., Lyondell Chemical 20 ), and fossilfuel-related businesses (e.g., Energy Future Holdings21). For the year ended June 30,
2017, about 5,900 companies filed for Chapter 11 relief. 22 Since 1995, over 1000 very
large companies—those with more than $100 million in assets and publicly-traded
securities—have reorganized in this way.23
Not all distressed firms successfully reorganize. Those that try and fail will likely
have their assets liquidated, either under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or through
state-court or private proceedings.
The distinction between reorganization and
liquidation suggests a somewhat starker set of choices than troubled companies actually
face, however. Although the bootstrap remains an important, perhaps the modal, form of
reorganization, many corporate debtors sell some or all assets or lines of business through
the Chapter 11 process, even as they may remain going concerns. The key point is that
the company, or a readily identifiable portion of it, survives in altered form
presumptively better able to address the needs of stakeholders.

“As the history of corporate reorganization practice makes abundantly clear (from the equity
receiverships of the nineteenth century to the modern-day Chrysler and GM “reorganizations”),
“any particular ‘plan’ can be structured as a ‘sale,’ and any ‘sale’ can be effectuated though a
‘plan’ structure,” such that “there actually is no clean, clear distinction between reorganization by
‘plan’ and reorganization by ‘sale’—through the wonders of sophisticated transaction engineering,
each can be the precise functional equivalent of the other.”
Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of
Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1379. Whether the company is sold or remains independent,
the court’s intervention involves oversight of the construction of a new organizational framework.
12

In re Gen.Motors Corp., Case No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).

13

In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a Chrysler LLC), Case No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).

14

In re AMR Corp., Case No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).

15

In re UAL Corp., Case No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006).

16

In re Delta Airlines, Inc., et al., Case No. 05-17923 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).

17

Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1988).

18

In re W.R. Grace & Co., Case No. 01-01139 (Bankr. Del. 2011).

19

In re RadioShack Corp., et al., Case No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).

20
21

In re Lyondell Chem. Co., Case No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Energy Future Holdings Corp., et al., Case No. 14-10979 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).

22

U.S. COURTS, TABLE F-2—U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS BANKRUPTCY FILINGS (June 30, 2017), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2_0630.2017.pdf.
23

A window on the world of big-case bankruptcy, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH
DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu (adjusted to 1980 dollar valuations).
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Wealth maximization is the principal normative justification and metric in such
cases. “Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used
in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap”’ in a liquidation, the Supreme Court has
stated.24 Few observers challenge this presumption, or the judicially-centered approach
Congress has selected.25 This may be because in broad terms, it is viewed as largely
successful. One recent study of very large company reorganizations found that 70%
succeed in the sense that they remain going concerns, either independently or as
identifiable parts of other companies.26
Critics have occasionally proposed that the court’s role in business reorganization
be transferred to an agency. They argue that this essentially administrative role is more
appropriate to the executive branch.27 Indeed, when banks and insurance companies fail,
they are not permitted to use bankruptcy, but instead are overseen by regulators.28 While
it is true that bankruptcy is the only major Congressional power to be implemented
almost entirely through courts, 29 many find that the greater transparency and political
independence of the courts offer substantial advantages.
Judicially-supervised corporate restructuring is not limited to bankruptcy courts.
All states have receivership and analogous statutes that permit the restructuring of some
organizations within that state. When debtors such as banks or insurance companies
cannot use bankruptcy or when a debtor’s assets and creditors are concentrated in a single
state, such proceedings may be used instead of bankruptcy. While this may be rare, state
courts acting in this capacity function much like a federal bankruptcy court in Chapter 11.
In the Ambac case, for example, a state court in Wisconsin supervised the restructuring of
an insurance company subsidiary and coordinated its efforts with the bankruptcy court in
New York, which supervised the Chapter 11 case of the parent holding company.30
24

United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983).

25

This has not always been the case. Some early critics argued that the system was inherently inefficient
and should be abandoned. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050 (1992). More recent studies suggest that the system operates in a reasonably
efficient manner. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 606 (2009).
26

LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 972. Success in reorganization (understood as a confirmed plan)
appears to be a function, in part, of size. See Jonathan C. Lipson and, Christopher Fiore Marotta, Examining
Success, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 37 (2016) (finding in sample of about 1200 cases that 90% of cases
involving over $100 million in assets confirmed plans while only half of smaller cases did so).
27

The so-called Brookings Study proposed administrative resolution for consumer cases. DAVID T.
STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 196-218 (1971). Title II of the
Dodd-Frank reforms would have much this effect for the “orderly liquidation” of “systemically important
financial institutions.” Jonathan C. Lipson, Against Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of
Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 673, 738 (2015) (citing 176 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
28

11 U.S.C. § 109(b).

29

Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards A Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 605, 644 (2008).
30

See Michael J. de la Merced, Ambac Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, available at
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/ambac-files-for-bankruptcy/?_r=0.

5
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B. Public Law Litigation
Structural injunctions address a broad range of the operations of government
agency defendants. These decrees are most strongly identified with civil rights claims,
but they can be found in other areas.31 Public law litigation is most closely identified
with the federal courts, but a substantial number of structural decrees have emerged from
state courts, including some of the most ambitious. 32 Since the mid-1990s when the
Supreme Court reversed two structural decrees as abuses of remedial discretion, PLL has
sometimes been described as moribund33, but as with similar assertions in bankruptcy,
such claims are exaggerated.34
The area where the claim of decline has been most thoroughly studied is
incarceration. This is the sector where there has been the strongest pushback against
systemic relief, both from appellate decisions heightening proof burdens and a federal
statute designed to restrict remedial discretion. Margo Schlanger reports that, while the
number of orders has declined and their scope has narrowed in recent decades, structural
intervention still plays a prominent role in prison reform. In 2011, the Supreme Court
affirmed a population cap order effectively requiring the release of tens of thousands of
prisoners in California. In 2006, the latest date for which data is available, about a third
31

They have occurred in many complex environmental controversies. E.g., CHARLES M HAAR,
MASTERING BOSTON HARBOR: COURTS, DOLPHINS, AND IMPERILED WATERS (2005) (describing the courtinduced clean-up of Boston Harbor). They also have a long lineage in antitrust law. RICHARD EPSTEIN,
ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007). And they have some resemblance to
recent practice in which corporations agree to submit to monitoring and adopt compliance procedures in
return for deferral of prosecution for violation of, for example, the securities laws or the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS (2014).
32

E.g., Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703 (1980) (approving decree reforming the Boston
Housing Authority); HAAR, supra note 31, (chronicling the judicially-supervised clean-up of Boston
harbor); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1998)
(chronicling the decades-long judicial efforts to induce reform of exclusionary zoning practices in New
Jersey).
33

E.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177,
1195 (2009) (characterizing the structural injunction as “a dying breed”); Gillian Metzger, The
Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L. J. 1836 1860-61 (2015) (doubting the “broad availability of
systemic challenges”). The two famous cases reversing systemic relief are Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995), a school desegregation case, and Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), a prison case.
34

Since the reversal in Casey, the Court has upheld extensive structural relief in the prison context. Brown
v. Plata, 563 US 493 (2011) (upholding order likely to require release of thousands of prisoners). The
Court’s post-Jenkins decision rejecting gender segregation at Virginia Military Institute foreseeably
required a complex remedial response (though here judicial supervision turned out to be less intense). US
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Katherine Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of United States
v. Virginia, in Woman and the Law Stories xx, xx-xx (Elizabeth Schneider and Stephanie Wildman eds
2010). In their critique of structural injunctions, Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod noted a widespread
belief that the practice is “over and done with” but rejected the belief as mistaken. SANDLER &
SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 10. Other scholars noting the continued vitality of PLL include Myriam
Gilles, An Autopsy on the Structural Reform Injunction: Ooops … It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
143 (2003); Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIGATION 113
(2007); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). See also the recent sources cited below in notes [].
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of the prisoners in California’s local jails and eleven percent of the nationwide jail
population were in facilities covered by framework decrees governing inmate
population.35
The story is similar in other areas: a decline in number and narrowing in scope of
structural orders, but still a substantial number of pending cases and active decrees that
are a major influence in many jurisdictions on schools, 36 mental health institutions, 37
police departments, 38 child protection agencies, 39 and environmental regulation and
management agencies. 40 For example, a 2006 survey of child protective services
litigation reports that in the preceding ten years, class actions against child welfare
agencies had been initiated in 30 states and that consent decrees or settlement agreements
were in effect in all of them.41 Or to take another example, since 1994, when Congress
authorized the Department of Justice to seek systemic relief for police misconduct, the
Department has achieved broad consent decrees or settlement agreements with the police
agencies of more than 20 cities, including some of the biggest in the country.42 New
York City recently operated under 26 settlement agreements or decrees mandating broad
administrative relief.43
To be sure, there have been changes over the years in the form judicial
intervention takes. As we show below, some of these changes respond to critiques of
structural decrees; yet critical discussion has not always acknowledged these changes.
Those whose knowledge of the legal system derives from appellate opinions are likely to
be under-informed, since appellate discussion is often out of touch with lower court
practice. The misapprehension is due in part to the fact that many cases settle and are not
appealed. (Consent decrees can sometimes be challenged on appeal where interveners
35

Margo Schlanger, Brown v. Plata and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 165, 197-98 (2013) (reporting data on jail orders); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions
Over Times: A Study of Jail and Prison Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 576-82, 602-05 (2006) (reporting
data on numbers of cases and orders and scope of decrees).
36

Lauren Gillespie, The Fourth Wave of Educational Finance: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate
Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010); David Rostetter & Katrina Arndt, Class Action Lawsuits and
Consent Decrees in Special Education: Recommendations for Practice, 23 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 195
(2012).
37

Samuel Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2012).
38

SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 48-49 (2d ed.
2014); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of
Police Accountability, 22 YALE J. REG. 1 (2016).
39

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTYFIVE COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 (October 2005).

40

E.g., Nathan Matthews, Rewatering the San Joaquin River: A Summary of the Friant Dam Litigation, 34
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1109 (2007); HAAR, supra note 31.

41

CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 39, at 2.

42

WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 38, at 48-49.

43

E-mail from Thomas Crane, Chief, General Litigation Division, New York City Law Department, to
William H. Simon (June 29, 2015).

7
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object or a defendant seeks modification, but such appeals are rare.) Misapprehension
also arises from the fact that practice has evolved in ways that make some of the concerns
expressed in appellate cases irrelevant, as we elaborate below.44
III. Comparing Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation
This part compares and contrasts key features of judicially-supervised
reorganization in bankruptcy and public law litigation, including the rationale for
structural intervention, the required prima facie showing, stakeholder representation,
formulation and implementation of the remedy, and termination of the court’s
involvement. In all of these matters, there are important analogies between the work of
bankruptcy courts and that of PLL courts.
A. The Rationale for Structural Intervention
Intervention in both spheres is a response to coordination problems presented by
multiple individual claim assertion and, in addition, by the need to protect vulnerable
stakeholders who would not be able to assert claims effectively as individuals.
1. Bankruptcy
The basic premise of corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 is that the debtor
is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal obligations on a large scale. The debtor’s
obligations may arise under contracts (as with bonds or loan agreements), in tort (as with
such famous examples as asbestosis and mesothelioma), or otherwise (e.g., tax
obligations). In the absence of bankruptcy, debts can be collected only on an individual
basis, usually in a state court of general jurisdiction. Large corporate debtors may have
hundreds or thousands of creditors, 45 and may have defaulted as to many of them.
Applicable state law is likely to follow the “race of diligence” model, meaning that the
first creditor to obtain a judgment and execute on it will have first priority in the debtor’s

44

A 2011 Supreme Court case involving a private damage action against Wal-Mart appears to have
prompted courts to take a stricter view of class certification in public law litigation. David Marcus, The
Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777 (2016) (documenting and criticizing this development).
The recent cases require a more extensive preliminary showing than in the past. Nevertheless, most wellprepared and adequately funded public law claims should be able to satisfy the requirement. For recently
certified public law claims, see, e.g., Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging prison
health care); Gray v. County of Riverside, 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D. Cal. 2014)(challenging jail conditions);
DL v. District of Columbia, 312 F.R.D. 1 (DDC 2015) (challenging administration of special education);
Unknown Parties v. Johnson, 163 F. Supp. 3d 630 (2016) (challenging jail conditions); Fish v. Kobach,
2016 WL 4060262 (D. Kan. 2016) (challenging voting restrictions).
45

See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026, 2009 WL 1959233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (71,312
claims according to cert.gardencitygroup.com/aps/fs/searcher); In re RS Legacy Corp. [Radio Shack], No.
15-10197, 2016 WL 1084400 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (15,919 claims according to Prime Clerk https://cases.primeclerk.com/radioshack/Home-ClaimInfo); Energy Future Holdings, No. 14-10979, 2014
WL 3828283 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (7,608 claims according to Epiq Systems Debtor Matrix –
dm.epiq11.com/EFH/claim); and In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., No. 15-01145, 2015 WL 302749
(Bkrtcy. N.D.Ill. 2015) (5,719 claims according to Prime Clerk, cases.primeclerk.com/ceoc/HomeClaimInfo). The number of claims is likely greater than the number of creditors, as creditors may file
multiple or duplicative claims.
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unencumbered assets.46 This will generally be true regardless of the size or source of the
creditor’s claim. Collection is characterized as a race because it is largely a function of
speed through the judicial system. For a debtor with many creditors, it is likely to be
highly inefficient and distributively arbitrary.
Inefficiencies stem largely from coordination failures and information
asymmetries. Absent bankruptcy, every claim must be prosecuted through a complaint
and, assuming no defense, a default judgment which is then used as the basis for seizing
property, usually through the ministrations of a sheriff or receiver in the jurisdiction in
which the creditor may find the debtor’s property.47 Any given creditor is unlikely to
know the position of all (or even many) other creditors in the race of diligence, and thus
their respective relative priority in the debtor’s assets. Even if they were to obtain this
information, it would be difficult to know whether the debtor’s assets were sufficient to
satisfy all claims or, more plausibly, which claims, since the debtor’s assets almost
certainly would be insufficient to pay all creditors in full.48
Some creditors will succeed, however, and they will have the power to force a
sale of the debtor’s assets to satisfy their claims and the attendant administrative costs.
Because sheriffs and receivers cannot generally seize or sell property outside of their
jurisdictions, creditors of a multi-jurisdictional debtor (which would be most large
corporations) face significant coordination problems. The historic example is the
railroad: if “the lines of the road [were] broken up and fragments thereof placed in the
hands of various receivers, and the rolling stock, materials, and supplies seized and
scattered abroad, the result would be irreparable injury to all persons having any interest
in said line of road.”49
It seems unlikely that creditors could avoid the inefficiencies of individual
collection actions by organizing and renegotiating their relationships without direct or
indirect judicial assistance. Most large debtors will have complex capital structures
which produce webs of interrelated debts. A single debtor may be composed of many
subsidiaries and affiliates, each of which may have separate or shared financial creditors

46

We discuss the rights of secured creditors below, and put to one side the effect that statutory liens may
have for select creditors (e.g., “mechanics’ liens”).

47

See, e.g., Penn. R. Civ. P. 3023 & 3104 (regarding judgment liens and execution).

48

Creditors could form groups and pursue their claims collectively. But in cases with widely dispersed
creditors, such as bondholders, or creditors whose claims may be contingent and unliquidated, such as tort
creditors, coordination is likely to be difficult, if not impossible. Given the temporal nature of statecollection law, creditors are likely to view themselves as competitors for the debtor’s limited assets, not
allies.
49

Oscar Lasdon, The Evolution of Railroad Reorganization, 88 BANKING L.J. 3, 6 (1971). Landon was
discussing the federal equity receivership of the 1884 receivership of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific
Railway (Wabash) that receivers be appointed due to the impending default of one of more than 30
mortgages it had granted. Wabash was the first American railway system to do this in federal court on its
own initiative. See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, 63-64 (2001) (discussing precedent-setting nature
of the Wabash receivership).
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(e.g., banks and bondholders).50 In many cases, some but not all debtors in a corporate
group will also have obligations to general unsecured trade creditors, taxing authorities,
and perhaps tort claimants or terminated employees seeking recovery. 51 Bankruptcy
exists because it is usually difficult for such heterogeneous claimants to coordinate when
the debtor encounters financial distress.52
Market-coordination can occur through the renegotiation of major defaulted debt
contracts. Although these negotiations often work, they are sometimes precluded by the
number and diversity of creditor interests. 53 This has led to a dynamic where some
creditors may be tempted to hold out for a better deal.54 Bankruptcy addresses these
coordination failures directly through the automatic stay, if a case is commenced. Even if
a case is not commenced, the threat of bankruptcy is a major factor in bringing
recalcitrant parties to the table. Thus, actual or potential bankruptcy is a major factor in
coordinating otherwise dispersed and potentially adverse creditors.
The market is also unlikely to correct distributive imbalances in the restructuring
process. Such imbalances may arise because some stakeholders are more sophisticated
and better-resourced than others. The well-endowed can exploit collective action failures
to gain relatively greater recovery shares. Professionalized distress investors, sometimes
known as “vulture funds,” can in some cases manipulate the process to increase their own
recoveries at the expense of less sophisticated stakeholders, such as unrepresented
employees.
Small public shareholders and employees have been thought especially vulnerable
to disproportionate loss of the debtor’s going concern value in a liquidation for the
50

General Growth Properties, the largest real-estate-based Chapter 11, had 160 special-purpose
subsidiaries. In re General Growth Props. Inc., Case No. 09-11977 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,
2009).
51

For example, property a debtor acquires after commencement of the case is unlikely to be encumbered by
a pre-bankruptcy lien, even if the security agreement had a so-called “after-acquired property” clause
purporting to encumber such property. Bankruptcy Code § 552 specifically disables such provisions. 11
U.S.C. § 552(a). Thus, revenue earned during the case could be unencumbered, and may be available to
general unsecured creditors under a reorganization plan, free from a pre-bankruptcy lien.
52

To be sure, there have been interesting proposals to promote ex ante coordination, e.g., through charter or
other contractual mechanisms that might effectively cash out of all creditors upon general default. See,
e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 323, 332–33 (1993) (proposing that debt be treated as “chameleon equity” on default). While
these models “may have been elegant, their particular proposals seem not to have appealed to the institution
contractualists extolled—the market, where they remain largely unused.” See Jonathan C. Lipson,
Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239 (2016).
53

Although there have been recent developments on this front, courts historically viewed the Trust
Indenture Act as requiring strict unanimity among bondholders in pre-bankruptcy workouts. See
Marblegate Asset Mgmt., et al. v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., et al., Dkt No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv (CON)
(2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2017) rev’g Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 542,
556-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232
(1987)).
54

The dynamic is exacerbated by provisions of the Trust Indenture Act that prohibit material changes to a
bond indenture absent unanimous consent of bondholders, which is usually difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain. See Roe, supra note 53.
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benefit of the senior creditors. Shareholders are protected by the possibilities of a
representative committee and a vote on a reorganization plan, if the debtor is plausibly
solvent.55 Deeming the interests of employees of “special social importance”, Congress
has given them enhanced protection.56 It is, for example, harder for the debtor to escape
collective bargaining agreements than other contracts.57 Wage claims have priority above
most other debts.58 Debtors may pay in full and immediately (that is, during the case)
prebankruptcy wage claims that might otherwise be paid fractionally at the end of the
case, as well as outstanding claims of so-called “critical vendors.”59
2. Public Law Litigation
As in bankruptcy, the basic premise of structural relief in public law litigation is
that the defendant on its current course is or soon will be unable to fulfill its legal
obligations, and individual relief would be inefficient, distributively arbitrary, or
unresponsive to some aspects of the claim. In each of these situations, individual relief is
“inadequate” in the sense of traditional equity jurisprudence, though the rights at stake
often arise from modern welfare and regulatory programs rather than the common law
rights around which traditional doctrine developed.
Inadequacy can arise in at least three forms. The second and third are analogous
to rationales for bankruptcy.
First, the plaintiffs’ claim may directly implicate a collective good or practice that
cannot be altered on an individual basis. The classic instance is desegregation. Given the
social and psychological dimensions of discrimination, it would not be satisfactory, or
perhaps even intelligible, to order the defendant to stop discriminating against an
individual student while it continued to discriminate against others like her in the same
institution. Many environmental claims have an analogous quality. The substantive right
is defined largely as a right to enjoy a natural environment in a condition untainted by
improper practices. Since the good here is indivisible, specific enforcement would not be
possible on an individualized basis. In both the desegregation and environmental cases,
individual monetary relief would be possible but would have two disadvantages. It
would be incommensurate with any non-material dimension of the claim. And it would
be hard to calculate even the material damage numerically.
A second reason why legal remedies may be inadequate is that, to the extent that
individual harms are foreseeable and preventable, it may be more efficient and more just
to intervene preventively than to compensate post hoc. Even if we assume that prison
55

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(2) & 1104. See also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining
over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 125 (1990).
56

S. Rep. No. 1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).

57

11 U.S.C. §§ 1113.

58

11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4). See also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986, 197 L. Ed. 2d
398 (2017) (Congress established employee wage priority “to alleviate in some degree the hardship that
unemployment usually brings to workers and their families” when an employer files for bankruptcy)
(quoting United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 32, 79 S.Ct. 554, 3 L.Ed.2d 601 (1959))).
59

See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004).
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violations of the Eighth Amendment can be fairly compensated monetarily, it might be
less costly to do so with systemic relief. If, for example, a court can reliably determine
that a prison system that delegates power to favored inmates (“trusties”) to discipline
their fellow prisoners will cause many more violations than an alternative system that
serves the defendant’s legitimate purposes as well, the most efficient remedy may be to
enjoin the “trustie” regime.60
Note that the efficiency calculation in PLL has to consider, not only the
procedural costs of the individual claims that are likely to be brought, but the costs of
injuries that, in the absence of systemic relief, will never give rise to claims because the
victims lack the information, resources, or security to bring the claims. In prisons, for
example, it seems likely that only a fraction of meritorious claims come to the attention
of the courts because prisoners lack the ability to identify them, or the ability to advance
them, or plausibly fear retaliation by prison personnel. At the same time, many nonmeritorious individual claims are filed in court by prisoners, usually in propria persona.
Prison officials seem content with this system of individual relief because it rarely results
in orders that interfere with their discretion.61 But they might feel differently if prisoners
were able to effectively assert all the valid individual claims that arise. Under those
circumstances, they might prefer structural relief to a long series of varying and
potentially inconsistent individual orders. Here, PLL resembles bankruptcy’s effort to
protect employees and small general creditors. The goal is not only to avoid the
inefficiencies of individual claim-assertion, but also to mitigate vulnerabilities that would
prevent some stakeholders from asserting claims at all.
Third, individual relief against public agencies can be distributively arbitrary in
various respects. To begin, it is at least theoretically possible that, if all claimants with
valid claims were able to obtain individual money judgments, the defendant’s resources
could be exhausted before all claims were paid. This virtually never happens, however.
On the other hand, it is not unusual for resources to be diverted away from activities that
are not subject to claim pressure in order to satisfy individual claims. It is expensive for
school districts to adjudicate and fund relief for “special education” claims, and it is often
asserted that this result reduces resources, and consequently, quality, for regular
education programs. If the special education students have stronger claims to these
resources than the other students, this result might be justifiable. But general education
students have various rights as well that might be jeopardized by a reduction in
resources. 62 Like the race of diligence that creditors run before bankruptcy,
individualized relief in PLL could produce results harmful to those least able to assert
their claims.
60

See David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1057-62 (2004) (describing trend in prison cases to prohibit inmate
disciplinarians).
61

See Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, A Large
Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 44 (2008) (concluding that “it is rare in corrections that . . .
information [from individual claims] is used to strategize harm reduction”).
62

See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1998); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 91-92.
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The same limitations can arise with class relief that takes the form of very specific
directives.
An injunction mandating compliance with deadlines for processing
applications may result in greater delay in responding to requests from those who are
already receiving benefits. Such distributive issues cannot be readily considered in the
context of individual claims. They are more plausibly considered in structural decrees
that more generally address the sources and uses of those resources.
The problem of collateral effects, or “polycentricity,” is often said to be an
objection to structural relief. 63 But individual relief does not avoid the problem of
polycentricity. Not only do individual monetary claims potentially draw resources from
other activities, but individual injunctive relief creates the possibility of arbitrarily
differentiated norms. Bespoke orders might reflect widely varying understandings across
different courts or judges. In general, the broader the decree, the more it can potentially
address collateral effects. Thus, polycentricity is not considered a problem in bankruptcy
because the decree there—the plan of reorganization—is all-encompassing, addressing all
of the debtor’s operations, as well as its assets and liabilities.
As bankruptcy is commonly seen as a response to market failure, Public Law
Litigation might be seen as a response to political failure. Two broad kinds of political
failure may produce the kind of systemic non-compliance that calls for structural relief.
The first is that electoral processes may be unfairly hostile or selectively
indifferent to vulnerable people and groups. Some constitutional rights may be clear and
yet not attract majoritarian support in the electoral process. Or legislatures may find it
expedient to enact statutory rights for vulnerable people while neglecting to provide
adequate enforcement. Or officials may use their discretion to pursue selfish and
idiosyncratic goals.
The second form of political failure arises from the fragmentation of executive
authority. The most common collective action problems in PLL, as in bankruptcy, arise
among stakeholders, but some PLL cases also present such problems on the agency side.
Authority to implement statutory mandates is often divided among multiple governmental
units that may have difficulty coordinating. The Boston Harbor clean-up case is an
extreme but revealing example. 64 There was a good deal of political mobilization in
support of cleaning up the harbor, and very little broad-based opposition. Yet, for
decades, this mobilization had failed to induce meaningful action. The key reason
appears to have been the extreme division of responsibility among federal, state, local,
and regional government entities and within each level, among multiple agencies with
overlapping subject-matter jurisdictions. 65 Coordination among all these entities was
63

E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 55-56.

64

See HAAR, supra note 31.

65

See id., at 64-78. Some political scientists have argued that excessive fragmentation of executive
authority is a key source of American governmental dysfunction. FRANCES FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER
AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 488505 (2014); Lawrence R. Jacobs and Desmond King, The Political Crisis of the American State: The
Unsustainable State in a Time of Unraveling, in The Unsustainable American State 3-33 (Lawrence Jacobs
and Desmond King eds 2009). A study of PLL in Colombia focusing on litigation on behalf of internally
displaced people argues that excessive fragmentation of executive implementation authority is an important
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difficult, and responsibility was diffuse. The key intervention of the court was to
facilitate and motivate coordination among these dispersed actors.
Underlying the political dysfunction rationale is the value of the rule of law. This
value limits the deference that courts can give legislatures and executive officials in
situations of systemic non-compliance. Legislatures have broad discretion with respect to
enforcement procedures, and executive officials have broad discretion when they operate
within such procedures. But even with respect to rights that are not constitutionally
entailed, the legislature is not free to create rights without providing for their
enforcement. And executive officials should be accountable for their implementation
decisions. The limits of this rule-of-law principle are uncertain, but no one rejects it
categorically, and some version of it appears to underlie structural intervention in both
PLL66 and in bankruptcy.67
B. The Prima Facie Case
The core of the prima facie case in both spheres is a showing that the defendant
organization as presently constituted is failing to fulfill its legal obligations.
1. Bankruptcy
Financial distress is the heart of the prima facie case fora Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy doctrine and practice sharply distinguish between “voluntary” cases, which
are “easy” to commence, and “involuntary” cases, which are not. A voluntary
bankruptcy is one that managers of the debtor (in particular, directors) choose to
commence. The Bankruptcy Code does not require a particular level of financial distress
to commence a voluntary reorganization under Chapter 11, such as technical insolvency;

rationale for judicial intervention. CESAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO & DIANA RODRIGUEZ-FRANCO, RADICAL
DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 63-75 (2015).
66

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (stating that the US “would cease to deserve th[e] high
appellation [of a government of laws] if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right”); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that the constitution requires adequate
enforcement procedures for some nonconstitutional rights and that adequacy depends in part on the
importance of the right). But authority has not always been clear or consistent on this point. See RICHARD
FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003) (noting ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s commitment to the
principle that the Constitution entails that there be practical opportunities to enforce rights). Compare
Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990) (arguing that constitutional due
process does not constrain legislative discretion with respect to enforcement procedures for welfare rights)
with William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 777 (1990) (arguing that constitutional due process requires reasonably effective procedures to
enforce welfare rights). Recall that the classic statement of the rule-of-law ideal emphasizes the
importance of effective enforcement procedures for substantive rules.
ALFRED VENN DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 107-22 (8th ed. 1915).
67

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 986, 197 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2017)(forbidding “rare case”
exceptions to deviations from priority rules on rule-of-law grounds); RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) (observing that the
“Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law”).
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it is enough that management believes in good faith that the debtor is, or will soon be,
unable to pay its debts.68
The task of establishing the prima facie case for corporate reorganization changes
when management resists. If corporate managers deny that the debtor is in trouble, but
creditors believe that a bankruptcy for the debtor would be in their interest, creditors may
commence an involuntary case. 69 The prima facie case for forcing a debtor into
bankruptcy is a function of both scale and financial condition. A corporate debtor with
more than 11 creditors cannot be forced into bankruptcy unless at least three creditors
holding in excess of about $15,000 in unsecured claims join the petition. 70 Those
creditors must be prepared to show that the debtor is “not generally paying its debts as
they fall due.”71
Creditors may commence an involuntary bankruptcy because they fear that they
are about to lose the race of diligence and want to prevent others from levying on the
debtor’s property. They may also worry that the debtor’s management will plunder the
debtor or simply continue to mismanage it. Yet, an inappropriate bankruptcy can
seriously disrupt a business, distracting managers, diverting resources, and destabilizing
relationships with various stakeholders. The vengeful litigant who commences an
involuntary bankruptcy against an otherwise solvent debtor may produce a fait accompli,
inducing the very failure the plaintiff purports to worry about, destroying an otherwise
sound business in the process.72Involuntary cases thus are not, and should not be, “easy”
to commence.73
Whether voluntary or involuntary, the content of the prima facie case is fairly
straightforward. Payment rights, and their violation, are usually easy to identify.
2. Public Law Litigation
The prima facie case is often more complicated in Public Law Litigation because
the substantive legal norms and the nature of the organization’s responsibility are more
contested there than in bankruptcy. We focus on civil rights cases because the contrast
with bankruptcy is sharpest there.
Formally, all public law cases are involuntary; there is no technical analogy to the
voluntary Chapter 11 petition. However, defendant administrators are sometimes
sympathetic to the plaintiffs, believing that a court’s intervention will produce
administrative changes, new resources that they cannot generate on their own, or judicial
68

11 U.S.C. § 301.

69

11 U.S.C. § 303.

70

11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).

71

11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (providing solvency tests to commence an involuntary case).

72

They may also find themselves sanctioned, as the Bankruptcy Code penalizes creditors whose
involuntary petition fails. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). See also In re John Richard Homes Building Co., Inc., 291
B.R. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (awarding compensatory and punitive damages to debtor where creditor
commenced improper involuntary case in bad faith).
73

They have also been fairly rare. See Susan Block-Leib, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions
and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803 (1991).
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supervision that will mitigate coordination problems. Although some critics find this
seeming conflict troubling,74 it represents an analogy to the voluntary Chapter 11 petition.
With or without sympathetic management, a plaintiff’s prima facie case generally
involves three elements.
First, the plaintiff has to show some harmful conduct that violates a legal duty. If
the duty is specific (say, a statutory prohibition on corporal punishment in schools) or the
conduct is egregious enough (say, rape of a prison inmate), its illegality will not be
controversial. Often, however, there will be a dispute as to whether conduct violates
some general constitutional standard, such as the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
“unreasonable” searches and seizures or the due process requirement that individuals in
state custody receive “appropriate” treatment. In elaborating such standards, courts often
look to informal social norms connoted by terms such as “shocks the conscience” and
sometimes to professional standards. In these cases, expert testimony is common and
usually necessary, especially where professional standards are relevant.75
Second, if the conduct directly causing the harm was performed by frontline
officials, some additional showing of responsibility is required for relief against senior
officials or a public entity.76 Doctrine disclaims respondeat superior in public law cases.
It is not enough, as it usually is with private law claims in bankruptcy, that the frontline
agent was acting within the scope of his employment. If the defendant has explicit
policies furthering the unlawful conduct or its senior officials have ordered or encouraged
it, that will be sufficient. If, however, the conduct or conditions that the plaintiffs
challenge is not the direct consequence of explicit policies or commands, plaintiffs will
have to show “deliberate indifference” by senior administrators, which means knowledge
of the conduct and at least tolerance of it.77. For example, excessive force by police
officers may contravene a defendant-agency’s express policies, but nevertheless be
widespread and accepted by management. Similarly, plaintiffs may complain of
pollution in a waterway or unsanitary conditions in a jail not because managers cause
these conditions directly, but because managers cannot credibly claim ignorance of them
or legitimately fail to address them.
Third, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct is systemic – that is,
more than a series of idiosyncratic incidents. In bankruptcy, the systemic nature of the
defendant’s wrong – the likelihood of its defaulting on a large but indeterminate range of
its obligations – is shown through financial statements. In Public Law Litigation, there is
no comparable standard form of proof, at least where the conduct in question is
unauthorized or contrary to articulated policy, such as excessive force by police or prison
guards.
74

See notes below and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that the “shocks-the-conscience test”
governs substantive due process challenges to executive conduct); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324
(1982) (interpreting the right to training and freedom from restraints of involuntarily institutionalized
mental health patients in terms of what “an appropriate professional” would deem “necessary”).
75

76

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

77

Id., at [].
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The plaintiff usually begins with testimony from members of the plaintiff class of
episodes of frontline misconduct causing serious harm. 78 This will be followed by
evidence of the failure of the defendant to adopt practices assertedly essential to
compliance – for example, use-of-force reporting for police, or contracting practices
enabling timely response to equipment malfunction by housing authorities, or training in
learning disabilities for special education administrators. Sometimes these practices are
mandated specifically by statute. More often, they are supported by expert opinion about
customary norms or by published standards of professional organizations. In addition,
plaintiffs may present data about aggregate outcomes or conditions – for example, racial
or gender disparities in arrests, average waiting times for processing applications,
sickness or injury rates for prisoners. Testimony about specific episodes is necessary but
usually insufficient. When combined with evidence of systemic practices and evidence
that the practices violate customary or professional standards, it can support a finding of
systemic violation, but there are no clear lines that define a sufficient showing.79
It is arguable that a fourth element of the prima facie case should be political
blockage. As we have noted, it is naïve to suppose that the political process will
routinely correct the systemic deficiencies in the defendant’s activities. However, there
may be situations in which politically-induced correction seems imminent or under way.
Courts do not speak of political blockage as an element of the prima facie case, and they
usually do not assess political circumstances beyond ritual acknowledgment of the
principle of presumptive deference to executive (and state) authority. However, the
likelihood that systemic violations will be corrected without court intervention is relevant
to the traditional equitable requirement of irreparable injury. If self-correction is
imminent, judicial intervention is not necessary to avoid irreparable injury. Occasionally,
courts do recognize recently-initiated reforms as a reason for denying or deferring
systemic relief. 80 This is akin to the implicit requirement that a Chapter 11 case be

78

The plaintiffs must also show standing – a discrete and imminent personal injury that will be remedied by
the requested relief. This is requirement is easily satisfied in many cases. The most notable exception
involves policing, where Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), held that standing to seek
injunctive relief against a practice of unlawful choke-holds did not arise either from the fact that the
plaintiff had been subjected to the hold in the past or that he routinely used the streets patrolled by the
police who engaged in the practice. According to the case, the plaintiff would have to show that the
plaintiff was distinctively likely to be subjected to the practice in the future. This requirement has made
police cases more difficult, but it has not proven insuperable. Moreover, standing is not a problem for the
federal government which has authority under 42 U.S.C § 14141 to bring cases challenging patterns and
practices of unlawful police conduct.
79

For a police case involving all these types of proof, see Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F.Supp.2d 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).

80

Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting as reason for refusing
to certify class seeking systemic relief that, even if the plaintiffs established liability at trial, "the Court may
not have been in a position to provide for more relief than simply encouraging continued effort and
improvement by [the defendant]"); see also HAAR, supra note 31, at 154-69 (reporting that the judge in the
Boston harbor case repeatedly invited political officials to moot judicial intervention by formulating a
remedial plan on their own initiative and entered an injunction only after concluding they were not likely to
do so without a court order).
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commenced in “good faith,” which is often taken to mean that the debtor’s problems are
multilateral, and cannot readily be resolved by a traditional legal mechanism.81
C. The Problem of Representation
Since the basic rationales for both bankruptcy reorganization and PLL assume
collective action problems that make direct participation of all affected parties infeasible,
the interests of at least some stakeholders in both types of cases must be protected
through representation. Thus, both fields have doctrines and structures designed to make
representation effective.
1. Bankruptcy
The problems of scale that impede coordination prior to bankruptcy do not vanish
when a company enters the process: A corporate debtor will have just as many creditors
(if not more) after it goes into bankruptcy as before. Chapter 11 manages this through
“official” committees of unsecured creditors (and sometimes other stakeholders)82 and, in
some cases, through unofficial, or ad hoc, committees.
“Official” creditors’ committees will be appointed in most large Chapter 11 cases,
composed of creditors holding the seven largest unsecured claims willing to serve.83 In
theory, members of the official committee of unsecured creditors are fiduciaries for the
debtor’s larger body of unsecured creditors, and must be “representative” of that body.84
This can be problematic where different creditors may have claims against different
debtors in the corporate group or their claims arose in different ways (e.g., contract
versus tort; bondholders versus employees). Moreover, it often glosses over differences
in the normative salience of the underlying conduct giving rising to claims.85 Both tort
victims and trade creditors are likely to be unsecured creditors of a corporate debtor.
81

See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Opportunism, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1035 (2011).
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11 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
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11 U.S.C. § 1102(b). Official committees usually exclude secured creditors as well as shareholders.
Secured creditors are generally presumed to prefer strategies that maximize the value of their collateral,
which may conflict with the debtor’s continued use of the collateral. Shareholders, by contrast, are likely
to prefer high-risk/reward strategies that may waste the debtor’s residual value (although, as noted, if it
appears that a debtor’s equity has some value, a court may in rare cases appoint a committee of equity
security holders to represent shareholders). As discussed below at notes __ , employees may serve on a
creditors’ committee, although that is somewhat unlikely.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); See also In re Bohack Corp. v. Gulf W. Indus. Inc., 607 F.2d 258, 262 (2d
Cir. 1979) (holding that creditor's committee represents the interest of all creditors and must carry out its
fiduciary duty so as to safeguard the rights of the minority as well as the majority of creditors).
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This has been especially acute in the cases of Catholic dioceses confronting significant liability for sexual
misconduct by priests. See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79
S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2006). Although not conventional corporate debtors, these religious organizations
have used Chapter 11 just as the airlines and asbestos-makers have. Yet, as one of us has observed, they
present acute examples of the problems of cashing legal claims out: “It may be that other mechanisms of
reconciliation and resolution would produce better results than those generated by our system. . . . . [O]ur
current thinking about bankruptcy fails to account for cases like those involving diocesan debtors.” Id. at
370.
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However constituted, an official committee is granted powers under the
Bankruptcy Code to investigate the debtor's affairs, participate in the restructuring
process, and pursue causes of action against those who may have harmed the corporate
debtor if managers of the debtor decline to do so.86 The debtor’s estate—not individual
creditors—bear the expenses of the committee members and the fees and expenses of the
professionals the committee retains (e.g., lawyers and accountants).87
The creditors’ committee’s most important role is usually in the negotiation of a
reorganization plan for the debtor.88 In the first instance, management of the corporate
debtor has the exclusive right to promulgate such a plan for the first 120 days of the
case. 89 The committee is expected to review and react to it, using confidential
information provided by the debtor about its operations and prospects. Prior to plan
promulgation, the committee is expected to negotiate with the debtor’s management and
other major stakeholders (e.g., secured creditors) about major actions in the case, such as
requests by the debtor to borrow money during the case or to continue or reject ongoing
(executory) contracts.
As in all aggregate litigations, a central concern involves the fidelity of those who
represent the debtor’s body of stakeholders. 90 In the early 20th Century, the
reorganization system was plagued with complaints that “protective committees” acted
not for the benefit of the widely-dispersed bondholders they supposedly protected, but
instead the insiders who controlled the debtor corporation. These concerns led to major
changes in reorganization practice, such that today the committee structure is policed by
the United States Trustee, a public official who assures that both committees and the
professionals they retain act in the interests of those they represent.91
In large Chapter 11 cases there may be, in addition to (or possibly in lieu of) an
official committee, one or more “ad hoc” committees of stakeholders. These are informal
groups of stakeholders with a common agenda. For example, holders of certain classes of
bonds issued by a debtor may form an ad hoc committee to pursue collectively a position
they consider to be advantageous. Because ad hoc committee members are not
fiduciaries, observers worry that they may be excessively litigious or, in extreme cases,
take opportunistic positions that harm the reorganization effort. 92 Although modern
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Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003)
(en banc).
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ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2015)
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Israel Goldowitz, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, & Kirsten Bender, The PBGC Wins A Case Whenever the
Debtor Keeps Its Pension Plan, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L.R. 257, 289 (2015).

89

11 U.S.C. § 1121(a).
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Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of
Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 749 (2011).
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See In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir.1990) (describing the United States trustee as “a
watchdog rather than an advocate” protecting the public interest).
92

See Letter from Hon. Robert E. Gerber to Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules, 6 (Jan. 9, 2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK%20Suggestions%202008/08-BK-MSuggestion-Gerber.pdf.
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practice includes a number of mechanisms to prevent the abuses of the protective
committee, there remain concerns that the aggressive tactics ad hoc committees
sometimes take may undermine the effectiveness of the official committees that are
expected to be more broadly representative.
Despite these imperfections, representative participation through official and
unofficial committees is considered the most effective available means of policing and
negotiating with management in order to restructure the debtor.
2. Public Law Litigation
Representation occurs in PLL in two principal ways. First, through the class
action mechanism, the named plaintiffs’ lawyers purport to represent an entire class of
similarly interested people, and judges have some responsibility to assess the typicality of
the named plaintiffs’ claims and the ability of their lawyer to represent the entire class.93
Defendants can defeat or impede a suit by showing inadequate or biased representation;
so they sometimes purport to act as watchdogs for the under-represented members of the
plaintiff class.94 Once the class is certified, its lawyers have fiduciary duties to both the
class representatives with whom they are in personal contact, and the unnamed class
members.95
Second, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) participate as parties and/or as
sponsors and employers of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. NGOs have structures designed to
make them accountable to their members or beneficiaries. These structures involve a
managing board sometimes elected by members and in any event with fiduciary duties to
serve the organization’s purposes.96
The class and, a fortiori, the NGO structures create only weak and amorphous
accountability. Weak accountability may be tolerable to the extent conflicts are not
intense. In practice, there is often broad consensus within the plaintiff class, and the
representatives are usually altruistically motivated. Yet, major disputes sometimes
emerge, and, as with ad hoc committees in Chapter 11 cases, representatives are
sometimes accused of bias. In the landmark Pennhurst case brought on behalf of
institutionalized developmentally disabled children, class counsel advocated singlemindedly for deinstitutionalization despite the fact that many parents of children in the
class thought their children would have been better served by improving the
institutions.97 The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, which sponsored many
93

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) (prescribing as pre-requisites of a class action that the claims of the
representatives be “typical” and that they will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
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Moreover, decrees are occasionally open to collateral attack by affected unrepresented interests. Such
challenges are occasionally mounted by public employee unions. Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989) (permitting collateral challenge by firefighters union to consent decree mandating race-based hiring
practices) with Floyd v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2014) (denying motion of police union to intervene
after trial to challenge on appeal decree mandating reforms to stop-and-frisk practices judgment on ground
of timeliness).
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Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002).
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See Bob Carlson, Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and Charitable Assets, in STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 203-30 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2d ed. 2007).
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Robert Burt, Pennhurst, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 354 (Robert Mnookin ed., 1985).
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school desegregation cases, pushed for years for racial balancing even in predominantly
minority districts where many blacks believed such efforts futile or excessively costly.
Blacks who favored a shift to remedies focused on improving the quality of schools in
minority neighborhoods felt they were not fairly represented by the NAACP lawyers.98
In principle, intervention is possible for stakeholders dissatisfied with the lead
plaintiffs’ positions, and it is possible for plaintiff sub-classes to be formed to contend for
competing positions. However, intervention requires organization and resources and is
therefore not routinely forthcoming. Intervention has sometimes occurred in school
desegregation cases, 99 but it is rare in most areas. In some cases, a stakeholder
unrepresented in the original action may be able to attack the decree collaterally in a later
one.100 Most stakeholders, however, would not be able to assert a sufficient interest for
collateral attack. In addition, like widely dispersed creditors of a corporate debtor, most
will lack the resources to pursue it.101
A final concern involves conflicts of interest on the defense side. Critics are
troubled by the fact that administrators sometimes do not strongly contest the plaintiffs’
claims and instead settle quickly. They speculate that such agreement might be
motivated by the prospect of expanded resources from the decree or the desire to entrench
favored policies against revision.102 Of course, in principle, defendants are subject to
mechanisms of accountability to the public, the very mechanisms to which critics point
when they urge courts to defer to officials on grounds of democracy. But such
mechanisms are clearly imperfect.
Moreover, administrators’ willingness to recognize the legitimacy of plaintiffs’
concerns is analogous to corporate managers’ recognition that a voluntary bankruptcy
will ultimately serve all stakeholders better than individual collection actions when the
corporation is in distress. In both spheres, managers may plausibly believe that
coordination problems require the aid of the court to solve issues being pressed by
multiple stakeholders.
D. The Formulation of the Remedy
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Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
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See Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles
School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244 (1977).
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Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attack by white firefighters on a decree
remedying racial discrimination in employment). Some PLL proponents oppose collateral attack for
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E.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 2, at 122-23; Michael McConnell, Why Hold Elections?:
Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. L. F. 295.
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In the kinds of bankruptcy and PLL cases on which we focus, the parties take the
primary role in formulating the remedy. In bankruptcy, the role of the court is less to
define the remedy than to induce the parties to engage with each other and to police the
effectiveness of the process. The court’s role is similar in many PLL cases, though it is
more often called on in these cases to impose a remedy where the parties fail to reach
agreement.
1. Bankruptcy
The overarching remedial goal in bankruptcy is the formulation and confirmation
of a “plan” that restructures the debtor.103
The Bankruptcy Code contains a fairly elaborate set of rules and standards to
approve (“confirm”) a reorganization plan, and each step constitutes a bargaining
opportunity. First, the plan must have been presented to creditors in a “disclosure
statement” that contains “adequate information” about the plan and the debtor sufficient
to enable creditors to vote for or against the plan.104 As a practical matter, the hearing on
the motion to approve the disclosure statement will often channel—and consensually
resolve—objections to the plan itself.
Second, the plan must have a minimum level of stakeholder support, generally
speaking, 2/3 in dollar amount and more than half in number of creditors entitled to
vote. 105 Outside of Chapter 11, debt obligations and associated property rights (e.g.,
liens) can be modified only if all (or almost all) creditors so agree. In Chapter 11, by
contrast, the plan proponent (probably management) must place creditors in classes, and
then proposes “treatment” for those classes (e.g., payment of a percentage of the claim in
cash; issuing new securities, etc), which each class accepts or rejects by super-majority
vote. 106 The logic of Chapter 11 substitutes bargaining and the ballot for strict
recognition of all pre-bankruptcy entitlements.
A court may confirm the plan over the dissent of one or more classes so long as at
least one impaired class has approved the plan and the court finds that the plan is not
“unfairly discriminatory” and is “fair and equitable.” 107 The “unfair discrimination”
standard prohibits differences in the treatment of classes that are not justified by
legitimate business reasons.108 “Fair and equitable” is a term of art which operationalizes
103

In an unsuccessful reorganization—and at least 1/3 of large cases may be viewed as “failures” in this
regard—the “remedy” will be conversion to a case under Chapter 7 and hence liquidation, or dismissal of
the case, which will in turn most likely result in rapid, piecemeal sale of the debtor’s assets. Smaller
companies fail to reorganize at even higher rates. See Lipson and Marotta, supra note 26.
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11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
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11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
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The court has substantial discretion in defining legitimacy. For example, in the Chrysler bankruptcy,
certain unsecured creditors complained that superior treatment for union claims was unfairly
discriminatory—to no avail. See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108
MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010).
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the so-called “absolute priority rule” (APR). The APR is a core distributional norm,
providing that dissenting unsecured creditors may be bound to the plan provided that all
junior interests are eliminated. 109 This has the effect of forcing those most likely in
historic control of the debtor (shareholders) either to propose a plan that in fact induces
widespread support or to give up their rights. The prospect of an imposed plan – a
“cramdown” – operates as a penalty default, a rule that threatens a suboptimal outcome in
order to induce the better-informed parties to disclose information that might lead to a
better result.110 Consensus often forms in the shadow of cramdown.
Management and committees will usually employ experts to advise them on the
business steps needed to achieve a plan that is, among other things, “feasible.” These or
other experts may be called on to testify at the hearing to confirm the plan in order to
enable the bankruptcy judge to assess the plausibility of the proposals contained in the
plan.
2. Public Law Litigation
As in bankruptcy, remedies in PLL most often arise from negotiation. Many
cases settle before a judicial ruling on the merits, and these settlements stipulate remedies
which will usually be incorporated in a court order, or “consent decree.”111
If the case proceeds to judgment and the plaintiff wins on the merits, public law
doctrine, like bankruptcy, requires that management be given the first opportunity to
propose a remedy.112 The plaintiffs will invariably have counter-proposals. The court
will respond by encouraging settlement. Indeed, anticipating such differences, the parties
will usually begin negotiating over the remedy from the point at which liability is
established.
For the defendant, the possibility that it can negotiate a remedy more favorable
than the one the court would impose is usually a strong incentive to deal with the
plaintiffs. From the plaintiff’s point of view, a negotiated decree has the advantage that
compliance may be more likely with an order that the defendants have influenced and
109

See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 55, at 130; Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and
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agreed to. From the court’s point of view, a negotiated remedy avoids difficult and costly
proceedings.113
As in bankruptcy, if the parties cannot agree, the court must impose a remedy.
Except in cases involving narrow issues with clear substantive rules, the liability finding
will not imply a specific remedy. The court will have to craft one from competing
adversarial presentations. The competing presentations tend to be dominated by expert
testimony from both defendant officials and experts hired by both sides. The court is
likely to mandate practices required by norms in the relevant profession, as described by
the experts it finds most credible.
Whether the remedy is negotiated or imposed, it will be strongly influenced by
experts, either as witnesses or consultants to the parties. Plaintiffs are often able to retain
as experts people who currently hold or are retired from senior administrative positions in
agencies like the defendant. They can also draw on standards codified by professional
associations. Like operational assessments in bankruptcy, PLL judges do not make ad
hoc judgments about the organization and structure of the agency: they rely on
negotiation and expert participation.
E. The Structure of the Decree
The core of the remedy in each sphere typically involves governance and
accountability structures rather than sets of specific rules or practices.
1. Bankruptcy
The key instruments effectuating the debtor’s reorganization will be the
reorganization plan and the judicial order confirming it. 114 Although the plan must
contain a number of provisions and is likely, as a matter of practice, to contain many
optional components, two are central to effectuating bankruptcy’s remedial goals.115
First, the plan must provide, directly or indirectly, for the debtor’s effective
management. This may require a change in the composition of the board of directors or
top-level managers, or both. Some management changes may have been made during, or
even before, bankruptcy. If, however, the major stakeholders have not agreed on
acceptable management for the debtor, the plan is unlikely to be confirmed.
The plan will usually provide for governance through ordinary corporate
mechanisms. For example, it is not uncommon for creditors to have representatives sit on
the board of directors of the reorganized debtor. They will then be in a position to
monitor the debtor’s performance under the reorganization plan and to hold management
accountable when there are material deviations.
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Second, the plan will cleanse the debtor’s balance sheet, chiefly through the
discharge of debt. The discharge effectively makes permanent the temporary injunction
against collection actions imposed through the automatic stay upon commencement of
the case. It will also promote new investment in the firm.
Substantively, the court must find that the plan is “feasible,” meaning that the
court has determined that “confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by . . .
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization” of the debtor.116 Feasibility
requires the reorganization plan to be based on a plausible business plan.117 The business
plan may not be explicitly incorporated in the reorganization plan, but it will have been
disclosed to (and probably negotiated with) stakeholders when their consent is solicited,
and the court will consider it in assessing feasibility.
Bifurcating the business plan and the reorganization plan permits a level of
flexibility that can be important to realizing on the promises embedded in the plan. A
post-confirmation change in market conditions will likely require a change to the
business plan. Because the business plan is not cemented in the reorganization plan,
however, changing the former does not necessarily require a change to the latter. This, in
turn, permits more efficient post-confirmation adjustment.
Following entry of the confirmation order, most important work in restructuring
the debtor will occur in short order if it has not already occurred. Thus, there is not a long
period after confirmation in which the court is likely to play an important, ongoing role in
the debtor’s reorganization. If the debtor makes the payments or transfers contemplated
in the plan, then except as the underlying instruments might provide (e.g., earnings
covenants), there will be no basis for judicial assessment. If, instead, the debtor defaults
on its plan-created obligations, it is possible that the bankruptcy court would be asked to
intercede—but it is just as likely that the entire debt collection process might start again
(e.g., with a state-court collection suit, etc).
2. Public Law Litigation
Key norms hold that the scope of the violation limits the scope of the remedy and
that the decree should not require more than is necessary to achieve compliance. 118
116
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These norms provide little guidance, however. Even where the substantive wrong can be
defined precisely, the measures needed to prevent its recurrence are not usually deducible
from the wrong. The court can enjoin physical assaults on prisoners, but where systemic
past violation of this norm has been demonstrated, deterrence will require more.
Professional standards may be helpful in specifying the required measures, but they are
rarely beyond debate. The matter is further complicated by the precept that, even if a
norm is necessary to deter the conduct in question, the court may forego it if it would be
too disruptive of other legitimate activities and goals.119
Moreover, the issue of whether a given measure is “necessary” involves an
ambiguity where, as is usually the case, there are multiple reasonable approaches to
prevention. It may be necessary to adopt one of the measures, but not any particular one.
Thus, the issue is better described as whether the measures chosen by the parties or the
court are “reasonable.”120
Some decrees may contain only narrowly tailored provisions. For example, a
recent consent decree in Mississippi provides that the defendant school system will not
use handcuffs as punishment for noncriminal student behavior or for any kind of behavior
by students under 13 years old.121 Even such a focused decree, however, will usually
require elaboration of the duty in written policies, communication of the policies to
officials and the public, training of affected public actors, and some monitoring. The
Mississippi school decree prescribes measures of these kinds, including an “oversight
council” composed of students, parents, advocates, and a mental health professional.122
A major category of decrees sweeps more broadly into the administration of the
defendant agency. The dominant approach of recent decrees of this kind is a departure
from earlier practice. Earlier decrees were often a collection of many specific rules like
the Mississippi handcuff rule. A decree with respect to prison conditions might specify
the minimum space for cells or the temperature of water in the showers. 123 Modern
decrees may still contain some such rules, but they tend to focus on general management
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functions of self-monitoring and assessment and on transparency and accountability,
often derived through agreement of the parties, expert guidance, or both.
Although there is much variation, we can give a general idea by describing typical
elements of the most ambitious decrees.124 Such decrees try to create a framework of
ongoing elaboration and adaptation. They begin with a general statement of goals or
norms (for example: “all children deserve a safe and nurturing environment,” police stops
must be based on “reasonable suspicion”).
They may then mandate some upfront structural investments. These might
include enhanced information technology for recording and tracking data and increased
personnel. The ecosystem decrees usually require important new physical infrastructure.
For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration Project decree required the construction
of new channels and ladders to accommodate fish.125
The core requirements of framework decrees concern management practices of
policy-making, monitoring, and reassessment. Management must develop explicit
policies or plans for matters that may previously have been left to tacit discretion. Police
agencies, for example, may be required to develop and implement explicit use-of-force
policies. Prisons may be required to have protocols for responding to medical needs of
patients. Child welfare agencies may be required to have both general case plans for
children in their custody due to abuse or neglect and specific “permanency” plans for
each child in their care.
These policies are likely to have as much or more specificity as the highly
directive decrees of the past. However, because under current practice the policies are
usually not themselves part of the decree, they can be readily revised without approval of
the court. Revision typically requires consultation or at least notice with or to the
plaintiffs and/or a monitor. The plaintiffs will have opportunities to object to them,
perhaps in some mandated consultation or dispute settlement process, and as a last resort,
before the court. But the decree contemplates frequent policy change, and often allows
defendants to modify the strategies or tactics they employ to reach the goals of the
decree. For example, in a child welfare case, “permanency” will be a goal for all children
in the state’s custody, but the defendant can experiment with different practices to
achieve it.
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D. Del.) (July 6, 2011).
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Settlement Stipulation, NRDC v. Rodgers (E.D.Cal., Sept. 13, 2006), at 8-10, available at
http://www.restoresjr.net/download/settlementrelated/Settlement_Stip_Final_As_Lodged_091306.pdf.
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The agency also commits to monitor itself in a transparent fashion. This means
collecting and reporting data on both the implementation and the efficacy of the reforms.
The decree may specify metrics, or it may order the defendant to develop them, perhaps
in consultation with the plaintiffs or with an expert consultant or monitor. Other
provisions may require intensive scrutiny of specific cases or incidents. For example,
police decrees prescribe routine review of use-of-force episodes and “early warning”
procedures that intervene with counseling, training, or discipline where data identifies
officers as outliers in terms of such factors as uses of force, vehicle accidents, complaints,
or absences. These decrees will often mandate or regulate the procedures of an
independent civilian complaint review agency.126
Some procedures, such as the “Quality Service Review,” used in the Utah child
welfare decree, assess intensively a sample of cases.127 The Quality Assurance system
developed under the California prison decree reviews data on all medical care and then
examines a sample in more detail.128 These procedures generally track the tendency of
modern public administration to appraise frontline practice qualitatively rather than in
terms of compliance with specific rules or with documentation requirements. The
qualitative data also generates more nuanced case information that enables defendants to
adapt frontline practice contemporaneously.
In addition, the defendant must reassess the policies periodically or continuously
in the light of experience. For example, the Seattle police settlement prescribes creation
of a Community Police Commission, with broad representation, to review performance
data and recommend policy changes. It also mandates a Use of Force Committee within
the department charged with reviewing reports to determine when practice changes are
indicated. 129 Ecosystem decrees sometimes mandate increased use of “adaptive
management.” For example, the San Joaquin River Restoration decree altered the
defendants’ water management practices to require more rapid and nuanced response to
indications of danger to the fish population. Prior to the decree, managers released water
to protect fish in accordance with fixed schedules. The decree required that they monitor
the condition of the fish continuously and adjust water release continuously.130
The emphasis on provisionality and re-assessment leads some courts to mandate
explicit experimentation. The New York police decree mandated that the defendant
undertake a one-year “pilot project” with patrol officers wearing body-worn cameras in
one precinct in each of the city’s five boroughs. At the end of the year, the monitor was
126

WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 38, at __.
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Noonan, Simon, & Sabel, supra note 124, at __.
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See Office of the Inspector General, State of California, “Medical Inspections,” available at
http://www.oig.ca.gov/pages/reports.php#.
129

W.D. Wash. Civ. Action No. 12. CV-1282), Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of
Resolution, July 27, 2012, at ¶¶ 3-12, 119-125. The DOJ’s “Principles for Promoting Police Integrity”—a
starting point for remedial design in many cases—demand continuous review of various data to determine
“whether any revisions to training or practices are necessary.” US Dep’t of Justice, Principles for
Promoting Police Integrity 23 (2001).
130

SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, A FRAMEWORK FOR
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER RESTORATION PROGRAM (Nov. 2010).
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directed to report on results and deliberate with the parties over whether the practice
should be adopted generally.131
Decrees often provide for monitors or masters. These judicial officers will be
appointed by the court, usually from nominations by the parties, and sometimes pursuant
to their agreement. They are typically experts in the field. These officers will have broad
access to data on relevant defendant activities. They will periodically assess the
defendant’s progress toward compliance and report it to the court. They may provide
information to the plaintiffs and mediate disputes between the defendant and the plaintiffs
over compliance issues.132
The monitoring provisions will often remain in effect for many years after entry
of the decree, and they typically contemplate periodic reports to the court and episodic
judicial intervention to resolve disputes about implementation. While the boards of
corporate debtors may provide a monitoring mechanism for creditors, a formal monitor is
unlikely to be appointed during or after plan confirmation, which is a difference from
PLL practice.
PLL decrees last longer than Chapter 11 plans, and may appear somewhat more
directive. But modern decrees have much in common with Chapter 11 plans. Both effect
change at the organizational level through adjustments to the defendant’s management
and governance. Both require some degree of monitoring and flexibility. Both create
mechanisms that subject their management and governance structures to enhanced
accountability and transparency. These structural adjustments are attractive because they
offer greater likelihood of success than traditional adjudication.
F. Financing Reform
In both spheres, the court cannot order the provision of financing (with rare
exceptions in PLL). Rather, it is up to the defendant, sometimes with the help of
stakeholders, to find financing either by re-allocating funds it controls or by inducing
outsiders to invest in the reformed institution.
1. Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy, creditor pressure may free existing resources by reducing
unproductive spending that resulted from managerial self-indulgence or inattention. This
tighter managerial discipline may also make the enterprise a more attractive investment.
At the same time, the discharge of debt and the management changes in the plan will
often induce new investment.
As noted above, to gain approval as “feasible”, the reorganization plan also must
contain credible financing mechanisms. Increasingly, debtors restructure by selling
unproductive or non-essential assets under or in connection with a plan. This permits
reorganized debtors to concentrate on core operations that, stakeholders hope, will prove
more profitable in the future. In some cases, outside investors (e.g., Fiat’s acquisition of
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Floyd v. City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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See Susan Sturm, "Mastering" Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062-1091 (1979).
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Chrysler) take an interest in the company and help finance its exit.133 However a debtor
finances its operations post-confirmation, those arrangements will be subject to contract
law and other rules that are largely outside the scope of the bankruptcy process.
2. Public Law Litigation
In public law litigation, courts cannot discharge obligations of the defendant, and
public defendants may have less discretion than private ones to shift funds among
different uses. Nevertheless, two of the routes by which bankruptcy produces funds –
more efficient use of existing resources and new investment attracted by a better
operating plan – are often available.
Defendants commonly plead inadequate resources as a reason for the court to
forego or minimize intervention. They also often stress that only the legislature has the
authority to commit new funds to reform. Courts are sometimes sympathetic, especially
to the separation of powers issues.134 But, just as frequently, they view such claims as
inconsistent with the rule of law.135
Reform does not always entail increased expense.
Ordering decreased
incarceration or the cessation of police practices that generate lawsuits may actually
reduce expenses (though it might generate less measurable costs in terms of increased
crime). Moreover, as in bankruptcy, reformed management practices will sometimes
improve use of existing funds or expand access to new funding. In approving a
receivership for the Boston Housing Authority, for example, the court noted that the
agency had been impaired in seeking funding by its failure to produce meaningful
budgets, in part because it had failed for more than eight months to fill a funded budget
officer position.136 Frequently, improved management enables the defendant to increase
receipt of resources it is already entitled to under programs such as Medicaid, special
education, and the section 8 housing voucher program.137
133

See Chrysler sold to Fiat-led "New Chrysler" after historic court proceedings, JONES DAY, Aug. 2009,
http://www.jonesday.com/chrysler-sells-assets-to-fiat-led-new-chrysler-after-unprecedented-courtproceedings/.
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E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (“When a federal court orders that money be appropriated for
one program, the effect is often take funds away from other important programs.”); Conor B. v. Patrick,
985 F. Supp. 2d 129, 157 (D. Mass. 2013) (explaining denial of relief in part by the fact that “redistribution
of scarce governmental resources [would cause] deprivation of other state agencies of the means to perform
their functions fully”). Even before getting to the question of remedy, considerations of scarce public
resources may influence a court in deciding whether to recognize a substantive right. See Darryl Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
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Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (“[I]t is obvious that vindication of conceded
constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to
afford them.”); Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming order requiring
official to complete listing of particular endangered species despite his undisputed claim that order would
divert resources from enforcement of other duties).
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Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 379 Mass. 703, 718 (1980).
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See Eighth Report of the Court Monitor, United States v. Delaware, Civ. Act. No. 11-591-LPS, (D.Del.,
Dec. 26, 2015), at 1-2 (explaining that the defendant had funded much its reorganization with payments
from the federal Medicaid program); available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826976/download.
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Where reform requires new resources, courts can order defendants to make their
best efforts to find them. Where the defendant agency has taxing or bonding authority,
courts have ordered it to exercise the authority. 138 More commonly, they order the
defendant to apply to the legislature or perhaps private sources for needed financial
support.139 With perhaps surprising frequency, such support is granted. Many decrees
have been supported with large legislative appropriations.140 Fresh support volunteered
by NGOs sometimes plays an important role.141
G. Defendant Recalcitrance
In both spheres, courts have difficulty identifying and sanctioning recalcitrance by
managers of the institution. In neither sphere do damages or monetary penalties play a
strong role. Sanctions tend to be indirect.
1. Bankruptcy
Historically, the bankruptcy process has been preoccupied with concern about
management recalcitrance during a case. Because Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
leaves management presumptively in possession and control of the debtor, in the early
days of Chapter 11, observers worried that debtors would run amok, wasting time and
money on professionals, rather than focusing on the reorganization effort. The Eastern
Airlines bankruptcy is often invoked as an example of excesses by managers who were
feckless, if not “reckless”, in “managing” the reorganization of an airline into a fire-sale
liquidation that should have been avoided.142
138

E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (holding that district court may require school district to
raise taxes necessary to implement desegregation order). It has occasionally been suggested that federal
courts can directly order a state legislature to appropriate needed resources, or alternatively, by-pass state
legislative processes and enact a tax itself. T.R. Powell, Coercing a State to Pay A Judgment: Virginia v.
West Virginia, 17 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17-30 (1918) (arguing in context of suit to enforce an interstate compact
that federal courts sometimes have authority to levy and collect taxes). Although the reach and continued
validity of this doctrine are unclear, it seems unlikely as a practical matter that a contemporary court would
issue such orders in PLL. See generally Gerald Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PENN. L.
REV. 715, 770-71 (1978).
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E.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 554 F. Supp. 132, 139 (N.D.Ill. 1984) (describing
provision of consent decree obliging both parties to make “every good faith effort to find and provide every
available form of financial resources” for implementation).
140

E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at 200-17 (describing the legislative creation of a new agency with
borrowing capacity to finance the Boston Harbor clean-up in response to judicial orders); San Joaquin
River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, sections 1001-10203 (appropriating $88 million to
support the settlement agreement in NRDC v. Rodgers, Case No. CIV S-88-1658 LKK/GGH (E.D. Cal.
2006)). In Texas and Kentucky education cases based on state constitutional provisions, PLL suits
produced comprehensive educational form legislatively supported by codifying statutes and appropriations.
See James Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, (2003).
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Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 247-248 (1975) (describing commitments of universities and
business groups to assist implementation of Boston school desegregation decree). In several child welfare
cases, national foundations have provided support to or for the monitoring team or directly to the
defendant.
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Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191, 211 (2005) (discussing “repeated
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Yet, the Bankruptcy Code, and practice under it, offer a variety of tools that can
significantly temper management’s resistance to improved performance. In some cases,
they are personal to management; in others, they affect the debtor directly, and thus
management indirectly. Perhaps the most draconian power available to a judge is the
power to terminate or modify senior management, either by appointing a trustee who
would replace management, or an examiner to investigate management.143 While both
events are rare in large cases,144 the options to do so likely have an in terrorem effect that
disciplines management.
Chapter 11 also contains other, less direct, mechanisms for dealing with
recalcitrant management, perhaps the most important of which is termination of the socalled 120-day “exclusive period” management has to file a plan.145 After that point,
outsiders can file plans, and these plans are likely to propose new management. The
threat of losing control in this way disciplines managers who seek to reorganize the
company and retain their jobs. Chapter 11 also provides positive incentives to managers
who perform well. For example, corporate debtors may adopt so-called “key employee
retention programs,” which are essentially incentives to remain with the debtor and work
toward a successful reorganization.146
At the entity level, a court may dismiss a case, or convert it to a liquidation under
Chapter 7.147 This generally has the effect of ending the reorganization effort and, as
noted above, is very likely to end the debtor as a going concern.148
If a debtor confirms a plan, and emerges from Chapter 11, the question arises
whether it will comply with the reorganization plan. Section 1142 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that the debtor “shall carry out the plan and shall comply with any orders
of the court” and that court may direct the debtor and other parties to “perform any other
act,” necessary for the “consummation” of the plan.149 This can create a basis for postconfirmation supervision by the bankruptcy court, although bankruptcy courts tend to
extensions of plan exclusivity in Eastern Airlines' Chapter 11 proceedings, which led to the erosion of the
firm's asset values and a 93% loss of bondholders' original open market claim value, as largely a
preventable, and now a probably unlikely, court error.”).
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11 U.S.C. § 1104.
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Lipson & Marotta, supra note 26 at 37 (“Although rare in all cases, trustee motions and appointments
were also more likely in large cases compared to small cases. Trustees were nearly twice as likely to be
sought in large cases (7.6% of small cases; 12.6% of large cases), and were over 1.7 times more likely to be
appointed in large cases (2.1% of small cases; 3.7% of large cases).”).
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Pub. L. 109–8, title IV, §§ 411, 437, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 106, 113 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)).
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See Jonathan C. Lipson, Where's the Beef? A Few Words About Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy,
156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 64, 76 (2007) (citing In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354 (BRL), 2006 WL
3479406, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006) (“[S]ection 503(c) was not intended to foreclose a Chapter
11 debtor from reasonably compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ for their contribution to the
debtors' reorganization.”)).
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11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) & (4).
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Conversion and dismissal are rarer among larger than among smaller cases. Lipson & Marotta, supra
note 26, at 37.
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11 U.S.C. § 1142.
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view this narrowly. In part, this may be because the business plan that provides the
details of the reorganization may not be part of the Chapter 11 plan that is the formal
decree. If a debtor fails directly to comply with a provision of the reorganization plan, it
may be a default that is remedied under section 1142. If, however, the debtor defaults on
new debt obligations incurred after emerging from bankruptcy, creditors will have to
resort to ordinary collection mechanisms or anticipate that the debtor will commence a
subsequent Chapter 11 case.
2. Public Law Litigation
Once a PLL decree is in place, there are often significant informal pressures on
defendants to comply. Defendants may strive to comply because senior agency managers
recognize the legitimacy of prescribed practices, which are often prevalent in peer
institutions or supported by professional norms. Few managers, however, welcome the
intrusion by the court and the plaintiffs in their day-to-day operations, and the desire to
get out from under their supervision may motivate compliance efforts even with demands
they resent. State agencies are usually defended by the attorney general’s office, and
these lawyers will be observing their efforts. In addition, the lawsuit and the decree may
attract close attention from governors or mayors or other senior officials. Depending on
the sympathies of these officials, their attention may generate added pressures for
compliance and exit from the suit. In addition, the proceedings and the decree will likely
generate media attention. If the plaintiffs’ claims are compelling and they are effective in
dealing with the media, publicity may add to compliance pressure. (However, defendants
are sometimes successful in inducing countervailing political and media pressure against
the court’s intervention.)
Nevertheless, willful or reckless failures to comply are not unusual. When the
courts conclude that compliance will not follow from its commands alone, it has coercive
options. It can hold the officials in contempt and impose fines or, in theory,
incarceration. Appellate doctrine tends to disfavor this course.150 Where the violation
constitutes a breach of a condition of federal funding, the court can order cessation of the
funding, though such an order is not likely to facilitate compliance. More aggressively,
the court can order closure of the program or facility where the offending practices occur.
Courts are more likely to threaten such action than to undertake it, but they have imposed
prison population caps, which are effectively partial facility closures.151
Courts can sometimes create pressure for compliance by enjoining collateral
activities that the defendants wish to undertake until they have completed the obligations
they resist. For example, a court might enjoin a municipality from granting building
permits for new construction or a water agency from continuing certain deliveries until
they undertake action to remedy environmental damage. 152 At the extreme, where
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United States v. Spallone, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (reversing large contempt fines against individual city
council members despite findings of long history of obstruction); see also Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443,
442-43 (2009) (noting in the course of reversing on other grounds that the district court imposed contempt
sanctions of up to $2 million a day).
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Brown v. Plata, 563 US 493 (2011)(upholding population cap order).

152

E.g., HAAR, supra note 31, at __ (noting that the court in the Boston Harbor case threatened to enjoin
sewer hook-ups for no residences unless action was taken to remedy pollution to the Harbor).
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compliance under current management seems hopeless, the courts can displace
management and turn over control to a receiver. They have done so in cases involving
housing authorities, jails and prisons, mental health and disability institutions, school
systems, among other public institutions.153 This is, in important respects, analogous to
appointing a trustee to run a large corporate debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
In general, courts seem reluctant to adopt coercive measures both because they
put the court most starkly in opposition to a coordinate branch of government and
because, if the sanctions prove inadequate to induce compliance, the court will look weak
or ineffectual. As with cramdown or liquidation in bankruptcy, courts hope that the
threat of sanctions will be sufficient to overcome recalcitrance. They view draconian
sanctions as a penalty default designed to induce the defendant to negotiate a better
remedy with the plaintiffs.
H. Modifying and Terminating the Decree
Active judicial involvement in bankruptcy after approval of a Chapter 11 plan
tends to be minimal, and plans have relatively short terms. Because judicial oversight in
PLL is more extensive and long-term, provisions regarding modification and termination
of decrees are more important.
1. Bankruptcy
After confirmation, reorganization plans are usually implemented fairly quickly.
Important governance changes will usually have been front-loaded into the plan, so that
effectuating them will be something of a formality following confirmation. Asset sales
and distributions of cash or securities under the plan will likewise usually occur fairly
quickly after confirmation. Failures to do so will usually be interpreted as material
defaults under the plan, which may have the practical effect of leading a court to
conclude that the case should be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation or dismissed.
For a limited time, a plan can be modified after confirmation, although
modifications may not undermine the major procedural or substantive elements of the
plan as it was confirmed (e.g., classification, treatment, etc). More important, plans
cannot be modified after “substantial consummation.” Substantial consummation focuses
on whether the major transactions contemplated by the plan have, in fact, been
completed.154 If so, then absent provisions in the plan or confirmation order specifically
Cases approving receiverships or related remedies include Morgan v. McDonough, 540 f.2d 527 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S.C.t 743 (1977). (imposing receivership of high school in connection with citywide desegregation effort); Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703 (1980) (imposing receivership for
housing authority); Allen v. City of Oakland (N.D. Cal. 3:00 CV 04599-THE), Order of March 3, 2013
(imposing police department “compliance director”); Plata v. Brown, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(imposing receiver to supervise prison health care); Petties v. D.C. (D.D.C. 95-148 [PLF]), Order of August
7, 2000 (imposing “transportation administrator” for school special needs program); Judge Rotenberg
Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430 (1996) (imposing receiver
for residential facility for developmentally disabled); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Chief
Exec., 444 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. App. 1989) (imposing receiver for jail).
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“Substantial consummation” is defined as “(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property
proposed by the plan to be transferred;(B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under
the plan of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the
plan; and(C) commencement of distribution under the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101.
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retaining jurisdiction,155 the bankruptcy court’s role in the restructuring is for all practical
purposes at an end.156
This is not, however, to say that confirmed plans always work. Rather, a small
but important number of companies that have operated after plan confirmation and
consummation have required another Chapter 11 restructuring, either to address
unsatisfied obligations under the prior plan, or new problems not anticipated at the time
the earlier plan was confirmed.157Still, Chapter 11 reorganization plans—the heart of the
restructuring—are confirmed fairly quickly. All told, pre-bankruptcy negotiations
through substantial consummation of the plan may occur in one, and rarely more than
two, years. This is obviously quite a bit faster than the period during which public
agencies are typically under judicial supervision in PLL, sometimes running into decades.
2. Public Law Litigation
The standard for modification of a decree requires the objecting party to show
changed circumstances that make continued enforcement “inequitable” or “not in the
public interest.”158 This is uncontroversial in the abstract, but interpretation raises some
difficult issues.
On the one hand, it is important that the defendant not be allowed to respond to
allegations of noncompliance by relitigating previously settled issues. On the other, it is
also important that the agency not be locked into a set of practices that prove costly or
dysfunctional in unanticipated ways. Commenters have been particularly concerned that
in some settlements, officials may use decrees to immunize controversial policies they
favor against change by subsequent administrations.159
In Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court reversed a district court’s refusal to
modify a decree regarding English-as-a-second-language instruction in response to the
155

11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). In theory, a confirmation order can be appealed. However, U.S. Courts of Appeal
have developed a doctrine of “equitable mootness.” This holds that an appellate court will not reverse a
confirmation order following substantial consummation, if doing so would upset settled expectations under
the plan. In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015).
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In re Johns-Manville Corp., 7 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1993). So, for example, an objection to a plan's
feasibility is moot where plan has been substantially consummated. In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944
(2d Cir. 1993).
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See UCLA School of Law, Bankruptcy Research Database (Sep. 8, 2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/.
The Bankruptcy Research Database “contains data on all of the more than one-thousand large public
companies that have filed bankruptcy cases since October 1, 1979.” Id. It shows that several companies
have gone through Chapter 11 three times: Anchor Glass Container Corporation (1996, 2002 & 2005);
Grand Union Company (1995, 1998 & 2000); Harvard Industries, Inc. (1991, 1997 & 2002); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. (1992, 1995 & 2001). The casinos owned and operated by President Trump appear to hold the
record for repeat-filings, with four sets of Chapter 11 cases, in 1991-92, 2004, 2009 and 2014, respectively.
See Jonathan C. Lipson, Making America Worse: Jobs and Money at Trump Casinos, 1997-2010 available
at [] (Sept. 24, 2016) (empirical study of employment and revenue patterns at Atlantic City casinos in
connection with Trump casino bankruptcies).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
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McConnell, supra note 102; Horne v. Flores, 557 US at Slip 11-12; H. Peter Metzger and Richard A.
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defendant’s claim that it was no longer appropriate in the light of changed circumstances.
The new circumstances included recent research indicating that methods other than those
contemplated by the decree might be more effective and a new accountability regime
required by federal statute that addressed language proficiency.160 The good faith of the
defendant’s claims was suspect given its minimal efforts to comply with the decree from
the outset, but the Supreme Court remanded with instructions to the lower court to treat
the claims with more deference. The opinion clearly signals a more accommodating
attitude toward defendant requests for modification. However, it does not explicitly
change the requirement of “changed circumstances” making the decree “inequitable” or
“not in the public interest” as a condition of revision.
When the issue is termination rather than modification, the formal standard is
“substantial compliance.” This is generally understood to involve both current
compliance with substantive obligations and “sustainability” – demonstrated likelihood
that the defendant will remain in compliance. Sustainability can be supported by
evidence that practices of monitoring and re-assessment associated with improvement
will remain in place.161
Decrees often have a fixed term, though they can be extended if compliance is not
achieved by the end of the term. Some decrees contemplate termination when the agency
has met specified outcomes. Outcomes might include installation of up-to-date
information technology or achievement of specified caseload levels for social workers or
the reduction in waiting times following requests to see prison doctors. More ambitious
targets are more qualitative: for example, a reduction in sustained use-of-force complaints
against police officers or a specified percentage of children in placements deemed
“acceptable” by some audit process. Qualitative outcome targets can be risky because
unforeseen circumstances often affect what can reasonably be expected by way of
outcomes. Another approach emphasizes scores focused on the quality of practice, an
“input”, as opposed to an outcome, measure.162
Courts are sensitive to the negative appellate and public reaction to cases
involving decades-long judicial supervision, so they are often wary of requests for
extension. There seems to be at least a tacit understanding that the court should terminate
the decree when continued intervention seem likely to be fruitless even if substantial
compliance has not been attained.
There is some doctrinal dispute as to whether a defendant who is not in
compliance with the decree can seek termination on the ground that the agency is
nevertheless complying with the relevant substantive law requirements.163 In the absence
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See, e.g., R.C. v. Walley, 475 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1123-28, 1134-83 (M.D. Ala. 2007) for an exceptionally
thorough and thoughtful application of the “substantial compliance” standard. Horne v. Flores seems to
accept the sustainability requirement by referring to “durable compliance”. 537 US at __.
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Decrees in cases involving child welfare systems that emphasize an audit process involving qualitative
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of a showing of changed circumstances, such requests amount to a demand to relitigate
matters the decree purported to resolve. Yet, the defendant ought to be heard where it
says that it has discovered and implemented means to remedy the violations on which the
decree is premised other than those specified in the decree. Such claims are suspect
where the defendant has not made good faith efforts to comply with the decree, but they
ought not to be categorically dismissed.
PLL’s “substantial compliance” standard sounds like, and shares important
characteristics with, Chapter 11’s “substantial consummation” standard. In both cases,
the court seeks evidence that the defendant or debtor has not only developed an
acceptable plan, but also that it has largely been implemented to the satisfaction of most
constituencies. Neither standard requires perfection, and both embed an expectation of
good faith. Both operationalize the rule-of-law values that undergird these spheres.
While the details and timing of each differ, both are the main exit from judicial
supervision, signaling that the remedial effort was likely to have been largely effective.
IV. Complaints about Public Law Litigation in the Light of the Comparison to
Bankruptcy
The foregoing shows that courts and stakeholders approach public law litigation
and bankruptcy in similar ways: courts respond to mass default by facilitating negotiated
improvements in governance and accountability rather than inserting themselves into the
day-to-day operations of the organization. Public law litigation has been more
controversial than bankruptcy reorganization, but many objections to the former would
be, if valid, applicable as well to the latter. The comparison to bankruptcy suggests some
helpful responses to such objections as well as positive arguments for the role of courts in
addressing disputes arising from institutional dysfunction, which we set forth in this Part.
A. Objections to Public Law Litigation
1. Courts are not authorized or equipped to administer complex organizations.164
A basic challenge to the legitimacy of public law litigation asserts that structural
remedies require the court to exercise “executive” powers and hence to violate the
separation of powers. A functional variation emphasizes that judges lack the expertise
and resources to engage in restructuring and ongoing supervision of organizations.
The legitimacy challenge assumes an implausibly rigid conception of judicial
function. Contemporary discussion overlooks the broad range of administrative functions
American courts have played. In the 19th century, judges superintended a variety of
functions now associated with administrative agencies. They oversaw the regulation of
ship safety, the distribution of federal land, and the award of veterans’ pensions.165 Then,
as now, they administered estates and oversaw business reorganizations. In these
activities, judicial personnel were not just reviewing decisions by executive officers but
were often themselves making original decisions about compliance, eligibility or
distribution. Few contended that such activity was inappropriate or outside the “judicial
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power”.166 Today, both the increased volume and complexity of claims has forced judges
to adopt sophisticated management practices even with respect to conventional private
law and criminal cases.167
The bankruptcy analogy provides a direct response to the concern about judicial
expertise. In neither bankruptcy nor PLL will a court directly manage an organization or,
in most cases, specify its operations in detail. Instead, it seeks in the first instance to
induce the parties to negotiate the reforms needed to bring the organization into
compliance. More often than not, all or part of PLL decree, like a bankruptcy plan, will
reflect broad agreement. After that point, the court’s role is to induce compliance with
the decree and settle disputes about interpretation and modification—not to proscribe or
prescribe its terms. Where agreement is not achieved, the court may choose among
competing proposals by the parties, usually based on expert opinion. As with the
bankruptcy plan, the thrust of the PLL framework decree is to set out a managerial
framework that promotes responsible and transparent decision-making going forward by
the professionals best suited to make those decisions--management. After the decree is
entered, the court’s role is primarily to enforce the decree, as it would with any order.
2. Liability findings do not entail any particular remedy; hence judicial authority
is unconstrained.168
In both bankruptcy and public law litigation, judges may exercise authority over
organizational matters not specifically regulated by doctrine. This has led to claims that
judges in PLL act outside the rule of law. In fact, judges in both contexts are disciplined
in three ways: social norms, stakeholder consensus, and performance measurement.
Some dimensions of the remedy are dictated by business or professional norms.
In cases of dispute, norms can be established by expert witnesses or consultants. In
bankruptcy, for example, courts draw on established business norms to determine
whether a plan is feasible. 169 Comparable norms are often available in public law
litigation. For example, in policing, norms have emerged regarding use-of-force
reporting, civilian complaint review, and “early warning” intervention regarding problem
officers.
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In bankruptcy, the most important discipline of judicial remedial authority comes
from the need for agreement among stakeholders and bankruptcy’s priority rules.170 Key
remedial choices under a plan are made by the parties, subject to judicial approval. In the
face of serious recalcitrance either by management or creditors, a court will likely
threaten (and perhaps impose) default penalties ranging from appointing a trustee to
liquidating the debtor. All have the effect of depriving major stakeholders of the
opportunity to negotiate an alternative remedy. When the plan process works—as it
usually does in large cases—the court will have helped to induce fair participation by
affected interests which, in turn, confers legitimacy on the process and advances the
system’s underlying welfare-maximization norms. In addition, the success or failure of
the plan will be visible, and failure will reflect on the court.
There are analogies in PLL. A negotiated plan is not a requirement, but judges
tend to facilitate negotiation by the parties and sometimes consultation with other
stakeholders. For example, the remedies opinion in the New York police case asserts that
“community input is [a] vital part of the remedy in this case.” Accordingly, the order
requires appointment of a facilitator to organize a “remedial process,” including “’town
hall’ type meetings in each of the five boroughs in order to provide a forum in which all
stakeholders may be heard.”171 Reformers seek consensus because it makes compliance
more likely, and because it enhances the legitimacy of judicial intervention.
Finally, some constraint on judicial authority arises from performance
measurement. Bankruptcy incorporates basic accounting measures and reporting
practices designed to make success or failure visible. Since poor financial performance
will tangibly affect stakeholders, its prospect disciplines stakeholder negotiations, and
since it will reflect more diffusely on the court, it probably constrains it as well. Courts
want salvageable debtors to reorganize successfully, and to rapidly liquidate those that
are not.
Something similar occurs in PLL.
Consistent with emerging public
administration norms, reforms typically mandate performance measurement and
reporting and may specify metrics. Thus, success or failure should become more visible,
even as the restructuring may permit or promote some managerial flexibility. As these
measures make the agency more accountable, they also provide evidence of whether the
court’s intervention has been beneficial.
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3. Non-compliance is often due to budget inadequacy, and it is either undesirable
or infeasible for courts to mandate increased appropriations.172
We have noted that some PLL reforms do not increase expenses, and some
increased expenses can be met with resources freed by new management practices. Yet,
it is undeniable that many decrees depend on new resources.
In neither bankruptcy nor public law litigation do courts produce these resources
by appropriating them directly. In the bankruptcy context, the parties must convince
lenders or investors of the viability of the company and their plan in order to secure any
necessary financing. Although courts have some capacity to cajole recalcitrant current
lenders to provide more reasonable terms, they cannot force a lender to lend, or a debtor
to borrow. Nor could it otherwise induce outside investors to make new equity infusions
in a debtor.
In the public law litigation context, a highly assertive decree may order executive
officials with taxing or borrowing authority to exercise that authority.173 But courts often
disclaim such authority, and even where it might be available, seem reluctant to exercise
it.174 More often, a decree will require the defendant to make its best efforts to seek
resources from others It might require the defendant to petition the legislature, some
other government entity, or private sources for the needed support. As a practical matter,
legislatures have great capacity to resist such requests. The court can threaten to shut
down a facility or enjoin some activity (such as permitting new construction) that the
legislature favors. But courts are reluctant to follow through on such threats, and
legislatures know that. Private institutions are usually free to refuse to support reform.
Thus, it seems likely that the success of public law litigation in inducing enhanced
resources for reform rests, as in bankruptcy, substantially on forces other than the
coercive power of the courts. One important factor is the persuasive force of the claims
and the court’s order. The plaintiffs and the court will have mobilized stakeholders,
assembled arguments and evidence, and focused public attention on the problems. The
legitimacy of the framework decree can make future investment in an agency by a
legislature palatable, and possibly attractive, just as a restructured debtor under a Chapter
11 plan may be a more attractive candidate for private financing. In any case, the
political pressures that courts in public law litigation may place on legislatures are well
within our established constitutional framework. Whether exerted politically or through
market-incentives, courts in both spheres can induce new funding for judiciallyrestructured organizations.
Moreover, like bankruptcy, a public law decree may attract support from both
public and private sources by making new investment seem more promising. Like a
Chapter 11 plan, a PLL decree may have enhanced safeguards against waste, improve
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accountability mechanisms, and reflect a more promising operating plan. And to the
extent the plan has the support of the parties (and perhaps other stakeholders, such as
service providers), it gives some reassurance to the legislature that the new resources will
settle the controversy and achieve political acceptance. It is evidence that those affected
by the underlying system view the plan favorably.
4. PLL decrees ignore the polycentric nature of institutional reform. If you pull
on one strand of the spider’s web, the pressure will radiate to others. For example, if you
mandate strict compliance with welfare application processing deadlines, agencies will
shift workers from case maintenance to eligibility determination at the expense of the
former.175
This complaint is not made in bankruptcy. The reason for its absence there is
equally applicable to public law litigation, at least to the relatively comprehensive
framework decrees. Courts don’t intervene piecemeal. Rather, they try to intervene
broadly, inducing enterprise-wide (or in public law litigation, agency-wide or programwide) plans.
Moreover, polycentricity is not a problem unique to structural litigation. An
individual money judgment or a narrowly tailored injunction will also require resources
to implement, and without new appropriations, these resources may come at the expense
of other activities. Indeed, sometimes corporate debtors require bankruptcy because, as
in the Texaco bankruptcy, the company has suffered an adverse judgment so severe as to
impair its ordinary operations. Bankruptcy can be a firm-wide response to a problem that
was originally bilateral in nature.
Judges in cases seeking narrow equitable relief are sometimes told to try to take
account of collateral effects of their orders on other agency activities.176 But it may be
more difficult for them to do so when the liability determination implicates only a narrow
range of the defendant’s activities. By putting broad swaths of interconnected activities
in issue, structural relief forces attention to the relationships among activities and
encourages explicit and systematic articulation of priorities. And the framework
approach permits adaptation as new problems are discovered.
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Note the paradox: If the framework rather than command-and-control approach
to structural relief is taken, relatively comprehensive intervention is often more tractable
than narrowly focused intervention. Judicial rhetoric emphasizing narrow tailoring of
remedy to right is thus misguided. In bankruptcy, the right to payment sounds like it
demands a simple remedy: payment. In individual collection, that is what happens. But
when a large corporate debtor defaults generally, narrowly tailoring remedies to each
creditor’s claim would be impossibly wasteful. Coordinating an effective remedy in both
Chapter 11 and PLL may require—and reflects—wholesale restructuring rather than
retail rights recognition.
5. Plaintiffs and defendants often conspire to entrench preferred policy solutions
against political revision and/or to expand agency resources.177
In bankruptcy, managers and senior creditors are sometimes accused of
conspiring at the expense of junior creditors. Bankruptcy structures and processes create
a variety of checks to minimize this, including committee oversight, priority rules and
standards, and the appointment of an examiner or trustee. But bankruptcy doctrine also
recognizes that all parties have a shared interest in a successful reorganization, and it
does not view collaboration as categorically suspect. Indeed, it seeks to induce
collaboration, in large part because collaboration within this framework is likely to
advance reorganization’s larger policy goals of maximizing wealth in the face of financial
distress. As noted above, concerns arise with respect to stakeholder representation in
bankruptcy, but courts and administrative adjuncts (the Office of the United States
Trustee) have adapted practice to respond.
Concerns about management sympathy for or collaboration with plaintiffs in PLL
are more intense. Critical discussion seems inconsistent with respect to such issues. On
one hand, doctrine often insists on presumptive deference to administrators, even after
they have conceded liability or been adjudicated liable, on grounds of political
legitimacy. 178 On the other hand, when administrators agree with plaintiffs, they are
suspected of acting from nefarious motivations, such as empire-building.179
A few PLL decrees have been plausibly accused of policy entrenchment, and to
the extent that it is a problem, the Supreme Court’s demand in Horne v. Flores that
district courts take seriously claims for modification based on changed circumstances
addresses this problem.180 However, policy entrenchment is less likely to be problematic
in the large range of public law litigation decrees that take the framework approach.
Moreover, the framework decree emphasizes process and accountability and
leaves the defendant broad discretion to change practices so long as it does so explicitly
and transparently. Disputes can still be brought to a monitor appointed under the decree,
and ultimately the court, but the presumption with respect to such matters is in favor of
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flexibility. Such decrees are more accommodating of change than Horne v. Flores
requires. Indeed, their general tendency is to induce adaptation rather than entrenchment.
In general, administrative sympathy for or agreement with plaintiffs should not be
presumptively suspect. Where managers seem inadequately motivated to oppose
plaintiffs on specific contestable matters, that should be treated, as it is in bankruptcy, as
a problem of representation, not as a categorical objection to structural remedies.
Problems of representation in aggregate litigation are hardly novel, and courts in a variety
of contexts have developed means of addressing those problems.181
B. Positive Arguments
Courts are institutional reformers in both bankruptcy and PLL, our study suggests,
because they have unique capacities to induce reform. We summarize here several of the
most important capacities common to both spheres.
First, courts are independent of market and political forces. While there will
sometimes be claims that judicial decisions are politicized in some way, no legal actor is
likely to be less burdened by political or market pressures than courts. Thus, courts
occupy a special place in relation to the dysfunctions that contribute to the conditions that
often produce the need for restructuring in the first place. Courts can induce reforms in
both bankruptcy and PLL because they are removed from the causes of system failure
and the political and market pathologies that often prevent extra-judicial reform.
Second, judges in both bankruptcy and PLL have developed special operating
capacities to facilitate reform that give them a comparative advantage under conditions
where more conventional reform mechanisms fail. For example, while judges are not
experts in the substantive fields of the institutions they help to reform—whether police
departments or airlines—they are experts in delimiting and resolving disputes. Thus, in
both bankruptcy and PLL, judges are able to assess the transparency and fairness,
including the adequacy of representation, of the process that produced the agreement. At
the same time, they are likely to promote agreement where possible to achieve plans of
reorganization or settlement agreements that embody large areas of consensus, so long as
they appear credibly responsive to the underlying problem. Subjecting these agreements
to judicial review provides an independent check on the propriety and feasibility of the
agreed restructuring which enhances their persuasive and instrumental force.182
To the extent courts cannot induce agreement, judges retain the power both to
coerce through adjudication and to declare the law in order to help establish norms that
will guide future disputes. These more traditional adjudicative functions are not
displaced by judges’ efforts to facilitate agreement, but they instead work in tandem. No
one doubts that judges have a comparative advantage over other market and legal actors
in using traditional litigation techniques to decide disputes in other contexts, and the same
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would appear to be true in bankruptcy and PLL. And, because judges are experts in
dispute resolution, their warnings to parties about the costs and benefits of the choice
between litigation and settlement are likely to have significant credibility.
Third, courts may have a comparative advantage in their capacities to produce and
manage information. Both Chapter 11 cases and the civil litigations in PLL require the
production of significant amounts of information, much of which becomes part of the
public record, either through the litigation process or the plans and decrees that resolve
these cases. The public character of this work imposes a level of accountability on courts
and parties not likely to be found elsewhere. While the negotiations that lead to or
implement resolution may not be public, the factual record upon which decisions are
made will be.183 Moreover, the public record thus produced increases the capacity for
parties in future cases to gauge their likelihood of success and to learn techniques for
resolution that might not otherwise be apparent. Courts have long been understood to
play an educative role generally.184 The transparency of their work in bankruptcy and
PLL is no different.
This is not to say that bankruptcy or PLL is perfect. Indeed, observers and
practitioners criticize both, and we can imagine future work offering specific examples of
developments in bankruptcy that might improve PLL practice. For example, early
practice under the Bankruptcy Code was, as noted, challenged for the delay and cost
associated with the Chapter 11 process. This led some to argue that Chapter 11 should be
eliminated185—just as some today argue that we should eliminate PLL. Instead, however,
cooler heads prevailed, and the Chapter 11 system adapted. A similar adjustment has
been underway in PLL, and is likely to continue. The evolution from “command and
control” PLL decrees to “framework” decrees has been, in part, a response to criticism
about the rigidity and duration of the earlier decrees, and their lack of success in
producing reformed public systems.
V. Conclusion
Critics have for many years chastised courts supervising public law litigations
even though that same role and functionality are the daily diet of courts supervising
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. For these critics, the message of this paper is simple: If PLL is
an illegitimate judicial activity, then so too is Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since no one
would seriously make the latter claim, critics of PLL should more carefully assess the
character and grounds of their opposition.
We do not suggest that PLL or bankruptcy should be immune from criticism. The
mere fact that courts in both contexts do substantially similar work does not mean that
they always do it well. Indeed, we think there are likely important areas for improvement
in both contexts, for example and in particular, the duration of PLL decrees, which we
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reserve for future work. But arguments about legitimacy merely distract from those more
concrete projects. An implication of this paper is that scholarship about PLL should
focus not on whether we should have it, but how to make it more effective.
We thus recognize that neither PLL nor Chapter 11 are optimal solutions. As in so
many contexts, the real choices available to parties confronting large-scale failure are
amongst what Neil Komesar would call “imperfect alternatives.” 186 No avenue for
organizational reform—legislature, market, court—is ideal. We have shown how and
why courts are often a better choice for the difficult work of institutional reform in PLL
by reference to the highly analogous work they do in bankruptcy.
Organizational restructuring is an inevitable feature of post-bureaucratic society.
Contrary to PLL’s critics, we have shown how and why courts play a significant role in
the difficult and important work of facilitating these reforms.
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